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A BEHAVIORAL APPROACH TO ANALYZING
CORPORATE FAILURES
A Mechele Dickerson*

Recent corporate failures indicate that existing laws fail to give
boards of directors adequate incentives to acknowledge that
some financially troubled firms simply cannot be salvaged.
Relying primarily on insights from law and behavioral science
literature, this Article notes that directors have a natural
tendency to underestimate risks and overestimate their ability
to save an insolvent or near insolvent firm. This Article urges
the imposition of a duty to file a timely bankruptcy petition
because such a duty will encourage directors to consider the
interests of all the firms' constituents, including workers,
creditors, and the local community, when making decisions for
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a financially troubled firm. This Article argues that directors
of insolvent firms that fail to protect firms by placing them
under the protection of federal bankruptcy laws should be
sanctioned in the firm's subsequent bankruptcy.

I. INTRODUCTION
Many businesses that file for bankruptcy are hopelessly
insolvent, i.e., dead-on-arrival ("DOA''), before they even reach the
bankruptcy court. 1 This is not surprising, as boards of directors of
businesses seem reluctant to admit that they lack the ability to save
a financially troubled business. The magnitude of the recent
corporate financial scandals2 and the likelihood that the
questionable business practices the managers and directors of those
firms used are more common than originally assumed caused
Congress to enact sweeping corporate fraud legislation that

1. See NAT'L BANKR. REVIEW COMM'N, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
BANKRUPTCY REVIEW COMMISSION, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS 308
(1997) [hereinafter REPORT] (acknowledging that "Chapter 11 also attracts some
'dead-on-arrival' businesses ... ").
2. Recent large corporate financial debacles include Enron, WorldCom,
Kmart, Conseco, and Adelphia. Enron was the seventh largest corporation in
the United States before it filed for protection under Chapter 11 on December 2,
2001. Richard A. Oppel, Jr. & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Enron Corp. Files Largest
U.S. Claim for Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2001, at Al. It was at that time
the largest filing in U.S. history. Id. The July 21, 2002 bankruptcy filing of
WorldCom surpassed it as the largest filing. Simon Romero & Riva D. Atlas,
Extra Level of Scrutiny in WorldCom Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2002, at
Cl. Both WorldCom and Adelphia executives have been arrested on fraud
charges. Kurt Eichenwald, 2 Ex-Officials at WorldCom Are Charged in Huge
Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2002, at Al. Kmart executives misreported
earnings, acquired two new planes for themselves, and created a "retention
loan" program (then fabricated the true scope of the program to the board) that
gave almost twenty-nine million dollars to executives who left or were
discharged from the company. See Jennifer Dixon, Subsidiary Bought 2 Planes,
Purchase Came Just Before Cash Ran Out, DETROIT FREE-PRESS, June 20, 2002,
at A6; Amy Merrick, Kmart Studied Executive Conduct as a Focus of Its
Internal Probe, WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 2003, at A3. Conseco filed for bankruptcy
while it was facing a federal investigation of its accounting practices. See Jane
Hoback & Gil Rudawsky, Former Conseco Exec Confident Firm Will Climb Out
of Chapter 11, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Jan. 4, 2003, at C6. Finally, the trial,
conviction, and ultimate demise of Arthur Andersen is a fallout of the Enron
debacle. See Kurt Eichenwald, Andersen Guilty in Effort to Block Inquiry on
Enron, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2002, at A1 (discussing conviction "for impeding an
investigation by securities regulators into the financial debacle at Enron" and
announcing that Andersen "would cease auditing public companies").
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accomplishes the following: (1) tightens federal securities disclosure
rules; (2) regulates the consulting relationships that audit
companies have with businesses they audit; (3) increases the duties
of audit committees of boards of directors; (4) prohibits certain
insider trading; (5) enhances penalties for the destruction of
documents needed in federal investigations or bankruptcy
proceedings; and, (6) prevents corporate executives from using
bankruptcy laws to avoid securities fraud liabilities. 3
This legislation is a good first step. However, while the
proponents of the legislation may be correct in assuming that
greater disclosures would have prevented the scandals associated
with the Enron and WorldCom bankruptcies, it is unlikely that
greater disclosures necessarily would have prevented the firms'
financial difficulties. Since insolvency is inevitable for some firms,
the question that remains to be answered is how (or whether) laws
should encourage directors to place businesses under the protection
of federal bankruptcy laws once they realize that the business is
facing a financial crisis.
Current corporate and bankruptcy laws give directors no
incentive to timely place a firm in bankruptcy and fail to sanction
directors who place a DOA firm in a Chapter 11 reorganization
proceeding. Given the well-established behavioral tendency for
actors to be overconfident about the risk that bad things will
happen, 4 it is somewhat predictable that directors will be unwilling
to place firms in bankruptcy since doing so acknowledges that they
lack the ability to save the business or, even worse, may have made
decisions that contributed to the firm's financial crisis. This Article
argues that bankruptcy laws should encourage directors to place
firms under the protection of the bankruptcy laws before the firm is
hopelessly insolvent and that directors who fail to do so should be
fined in any subsequent bankruptcy proceeding. 5
Part II of the Article relies on insights from law and behavioral
science literature to explain why some directors might not admit
that they lack the ability to save a financially troubled firm until it
is too late for even the protections afforded by bankruptcy laws to
3. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, H.R. 3763, 107th Cong. §§ 103, 301, 306,
402, 802-03 (2002).
4. See discussion infra Part II.
5. This Article does not consider the usefulness or efficiency of bankruptcy
laws in general. Specifically, in arguing for a duty to file a timely bankruptcy
petition I assume that bankruptcy laws will continue to allow firms to attempt
to reorganize. I do not consider whether state law remedies are superior to
those provided in the Federal Bankruptcy Code or whether unsecured creditors
would fare better under applicable state law. I do, however, briefly discuss the
arguments concerning Chapter ll's efficiency infra Part IV.A.3.
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save it. This Part argues that the unwillingness of directors to
admit defeat is consistent with a well-established behavioral trait:
the overconfidence bias. I suggest that this bias will prevent some
directors from filing timely bankruptcy petitions for their firms
because placing the firm in bankruptcy would force them to publicly
admit that they either made bad decisions in the past or that they
simply lack the capacity to save the firm. This Part indicates that
the tendency to make risky decisions based on a good faith (though
misinformed) belief that those decisions will not harm the firm is
natural and well-established and, in most cases, does not reflect any
ill intent on the part of directors.
Part III of this Article considers whether existing legal rules or
market controls already give directors incentives to prevent DOA
filings. The first section discusses the fiduciary duties directors of
solvent firms owe shareholders and creditors and argues that those
duties fail to give directors any incentives to avoid DOA filings.
Indeed, this section suggests that the ambiguous nature of directors'
duties once a firm is approaching insolvency gives directors an
additional incentive to avoid early filings.
This Part then
demonstrates that current market controls fail to curb directors'
tendencies to make decisions that allow them to continue to believe
that their prior decisions are still valid. I suggest that these
controls are particularly ineffective once directors either know the
firm cannot be saved or conclude that they can make substantial
financial gains by delaying the filing.
The Article concludes by arguing that the law needs to impose
sanctions to encourage directors to develop a more realistic
expectation of their ability to resuscitate a financially troubled firm.
Specifically, I argue that directors should have a "duty to timely file"
and that they breach that duty if they fail to place firms in
bankruptcy within thirty days of the time either the directors knew
that the firm would be unable to pay its probable liability on its
existing debts as they matured or when they knew (or should have
known) that the firm's current liabilities exceeded the fair market
value of its current tangible assets.
II. BEHAVIORAL INFLUENCES ON DIRECTOR DECISION-MAKING
It is worth saying as an initial matter that it is unrealistic (and
unfair) to suggest that most directors are either intentionally
corrupt or serve on boards with the single goal of looting the firm.
Most directors intend to act in the best interest of the firm but may
fail to do so for reasons completely unrelated to any desire to
intentionally harm the firm. Certain behavioral traits may, in fact,
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prevent directors from acting in the best interests of their firms. 6
Overconfidence is a common human tendency, and highly
successful people in particular have a tendency to overestimate their
ability to control their environments and to avoid harm. 7 The
problem of the "overconfidence bias" is well-documented and
recently has been discussed in the law and behavioral science
literature. 8 An actor is susceptible to this bias if she believes that
the probability of a negative event happening to her is less than the
likelihood of the event happening to someone else or, conversely,
that it is more likely that a positive event will happen to her than
the likelihood that a negative event will happen to her. 9 This bias
purportedly exists even if the actor is an expert and even if she
knows the actual probability distribution of any particular event. 10
Likewise, behavioral studies suggest that people, especially
successful ones, have an enhanced sense of their abilities to control
events in their lives and that they will likely attribute positive
outcomes to their own decision-making abilities. 11 These tendencies
combine to encourage people to accept too many risks based on their
belief that adverse risks are unlikely to occur and that, in any event,
they can prevent harm from occurring. 12
Behavioral studies also suggest that choices people make are
"path-dependent."13 That is, people will be over committed to
decisions they made, will often ignore or discount new information
6. I am not suggesting that all directors have psychological biases.
Instead, I suggest that the law should at least consider the possibility that
certain psychological biases may cause directors unconsciously to make
decisions that harm the business and that a stronger legal sanction may be
needed to help directors overcome those biases.
7. See Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards:
Law, Norms, and the Unintended Consequences of Independence and
Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797, 807 (2001).
8. See Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economics Analysis of Redistributive
Legal Rules, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1653, 1659-61 (1998); Russell B. Korobkin &
Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality
Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1091-93 (2000).
9. See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 8, at 1091.
10. See Jolls, supra note 8, at 1659 & nn.22-23 (citing studies); Korobkin &
Ulen, supra note 8, at 1091-93 (citing psychological studies); Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski, The "New" Law and Psychology: A Reply to Critics, Skeptics, and
Cautious Supporters, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 739, 758 (2000).
11. See SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, POSITIVE ILLUSIONS: CREATIVE SELF-DECEPTION
AND THE HEALTHY MIND 16 (1989); Robert A. Hillman, The Limits of Behavioral
Decision Theory in Legal Analysis: The Case of Liquidated Damages, 85
CORNELL L. REV. 717, 723 (2000); Robert K. Rasmussen, Behavioral Economics,
the Economic Analysis of Bankruptcy Law and the Pricing of Credit, 51 VAND. L.
REV. 1679, 1689 (1998).
12. See Hillman, supra note 11, at 723-24.
13. See Langevoort, supra note 7, at 826.
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that contradicts their belief that their prior decisions are correct,
and will remain wedded to those decisions even if they later obtain
information that should lead them to question the decisions. 14
Because their present decisions and choices are constrained by prior
decisions, they will attempt to justifY and rationalize the continuing
validity of prior decisions even though those decisions might appear
questionable to an outsider who did not participate in the earlier
decision-making process. 15 Indeed, this tendency will cause them to
seek out information that confirms the respectability of their prior
decisions, 16 rather than seek information that suggests that those
decisions were unwise (or are no longer wise). 17 Even when
confronted with potentially harmful information concerning risks,
actors tend to interpret information in ways that serve their
personal interests or pre-conceived notions. 18
Finally, behavioral studies indicate that most actors have the
tendency to cut corners (but not feel guilty) if they think that their
choices are ones reasonable people would make and will ultimately
lead to a successful result. 19 Cognitive psychologists refer to this
tendency, a form of cognitive dissonance, as the "sunk cost trap"
whereby people incrementally make good faith (but overly
optimistic) decisions which cause harm to the firm once an
unexpected event occurs (such as a downturn in the economy). 20 A
director who does not recognize that what he is doing is
unreasonable, irrational, or illegal will have little incentive to act
consistently with any particular legal rule or duty unless he realizes
that he faces significant penalties or the imposition of increased
. 21
external mom'tonng.
Directors are probably more likely than the average person to
14. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in
Corporate Governance, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1, 29 (2002); Langevoort, supra note 7,
at 811; Matthew Rabin, Psychology and Economics, 36 J. ECON. LITERATURE 11,
26 (1998).
15. See Langevoort, supra note 7, at 826; Rabin, supra note 14, at 26
(noting that '"fresh' thinkers may be better at seeing solutions to problems than
people who have meditated at length on the problems, because the fresh
thinkers are not overwhelmed by the 'interference' of old hypotheses");
Rasmussen, supra note 11, at 1689-90.
16. Rabin, supra note 14, at 26.
17. See TAYLOR, supra note 11, at 27; Langevoort, supra note 7, at 826;
Rasmussen, supra note 11, at 1689-90.
18. See TAYLOR, supra note 11, at 28; Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 8, at
1093.
19. See Donald C. Langevoort, Seeking Sunlight in Santa Fe's Shadow: The
SEC's Pursuit of Managerial Accountability, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 449, 482 (2001).
20. See id. at 481-83 (discussing how sunk cost trap and overoptimism bias
may affect corporate officers' decision-making process).
21. Id.
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be overconfident about their abilities to make correct decisions.
Unfortunately, directors who are susceptible to the overconfidence
bias will be less likely to admit that they cannot save a financially
troubled firm until it is too late for anyone (including a bankruptcy
judge) to resuscitate the firm. Because the overconfidence bias
causes people who are factually informed of the likelihood ofharm to
make incorrect decisions, even directors with full knowledge of the
firm's finances may still be unrealistically optimistic about the
firm's ability to recover. 22 Indeed, the behavioral tendencies to be
overconfident and over committed to prior decisions cause directors
to try to find ways to justify the reasonableness of their prior
decisions rather than focusing on taking steps to remedy the firm's
existing solvency problems.
Ill.

EXISTING CONTROLS FAIL TO CONSTRAIN DIRECTORIAL
DECISION MAKING

A

Fiduciary Duties
Directors have no explicit duty to consider whether it is in the
firm's interests for directors to reEnquish exclusive control over the
firm by either seeking help from external insolvency or turnaround
experts, or by placing it under the control and protection of federal
bankruptcy laws. Because current corporate laws do impose broad
fiduciary duties on directors, the desire to avoid the monetary
liability, inconvenience, and potential embarrassment associated
with litigation arguably gives directors an incentive to avoid DOA
filings, thus protecting the firm's interests. As the next sections
demonstrate, however, directors' unwillingness to harm (and
potentially eliminate) shareholders' interests by placing the firm in
bankruptcy is likely attributable to the vague nature of the
directors' fiduciary duties to shareholders and other constituents of
the firm both before and after a firm becomes insolvent. Thus, the
behavioral tendency to avoid an early filing combined with vague
legal rules naturally results in directors' reluctance to file early
bankruptcy petitions.
1.. Solvent Businesses

a. To shareholders. Boards of directors are given the authority
to control and manage the firm's assets within the confines of the
powers provided in the corporate charter. 23 These broad powers give
22. See Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REV.
1175, 1183 (1997) (explaining common behavioral biases).
23. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1974) ("The business and
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directors the authority to file early bankruptcy petitions for
businesses, but neither require timely filings nor sanction directors
who cause DOA filings. 24 Most states' corporate laws impose two
broad fiduciary duties on the directors of solvent firms-the duty to
avoid self-dealing (i.e., the duty of loyalty) and the duty of care. 25
Directors arguably have moral obligations to the firm as well,
though these moral duties are generally encompassed by the legal
duties of loyalty and care. 26 The duty ofloyalty requires directors to
protect the firm's interests by refraining from engaging in acts that
benefit themselves, but harm the firm. 27 Directors will be held liable
for breaching the duty of loyalty either when they used their
positions of trust and access to confidential information to
participate in transactions in which they have an interest, 26 or
because they placed their own interests before those of the firm. 29 A
affairs of every corporation ... shall be managed by or under the direction of a
board of directors."); REVISED MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) (1985) (stating
that the business and affairs of the corporation shall be managed under the
direction of the board of directors).
24. REVISED MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.0l(b).
25. See R. Link Newcomb, Note, The Limitation of Directors' Liability: A
Proposal For Legislative Reform, 66 TEX. L. REV. 411, 433 (1987) ("Courts
impose liability on directors for failing to exercise care, which shifts the risk of
loss from shareholders to directors for particular business decisions made by
the board. Two rationales justify this shift. Placing the burden of risk upon
decision makers both compensates shareholders for their losses and serves to
deter directors from careless decision making."). See generally Zipora Cohen,
Directors' Negligence Liability to Creditors: A Comparative and Critical View,
26 J. CORP. L. 351, 352 (2001) (discussing the rationale behind imposing
liability on corporate directors); Thomas C. Lee, Comment, Limiting Corporate
Directors' Liability: Delaware's Section 102(b)(7) and the Erosion of the
Directors' Duty of Care, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 239, 261-69 (1987) (comparing
traditional tort concepts to the duty of care in the corporate context).
26. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty of Care of Corporate Directors and
Officers, 51 U. PITT. L. REV. 945, 948 (1990). Those moral obligations would
include the duties to: reasonably monitor or oversee the conduct of the firm's
business and take steps to ensure that reasonably adequate information flows
to the board; follow up on the information the board acquires; employ a
reasonable decision-making process; make reasonable decisions. I d.
27. 1 WILLIAM E. KNEPPER & DAN A. BAILEY, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE
OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS 122 (6th ed. 1998).
28. Whether a director is an interested party varies by state law but
generally includes situations where the director is a party to a transaction
involving the firm, has a financial or familial relationship with a party to such a
transaction, or is subject to a controlling interest by a party to the transaction.
See 1 AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 1.23 (1994) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE].
29. Ledbetter v. First State Bank & Trust Co., 85 F.3d 1537, 1540 (11th
Cir. 1996); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985). An interested
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director who participates in a self-interested transaction involving
the firm typically will be . held liable for a breach of the duty of
loyalty unless non-interested directors or shareholders approve the
self-interested transaction after full disclosure, or the transaction is
objectively or intrinsically fair to the corporation.30
In general, directors breach the duty of care when they fail to
act diligently and prudently in managing the firm's affairs and their
31
ill-advised decisions negligently cause harm to the firm.
In
considering whether a director has breached the duty of care, courts
evaluate the information available to the directors, the actual
decision that ultimately caused harm, and the good faith or
rationality of the process the directors employed before they made
the harmful decision. 32 The duty of care thus monitors directors'
oversight and decisional capacities by requiring them to be informed
of all material information reasonably available to them and to
make decisions with a reasonable amount of attention and skill.33
While the duty of care primarily focuses on decisions directors
make that ultimately harm the firm or its shareholders, directors
also have an affirmative duty to act in circumstances in which due
attention would prevent a loss. 34 Allegations that directors have
breached the duty of care because of their failure to act most often
involve claims that a director failed to adequately supervise firm
employees or to monitor top firm executives. Directors (especially
officer or director has the duty to disclose all known material facts relating to
the conflict of interest and the transaction that a reasonable person would
consider important when voting on the transaction. See Weinberger v. UOP,
Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983); PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE,
supra note 28, § 1.14.
30. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a) (1974); Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d
1366, 1376 (Del. 1993); Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261,
1280 (Del. 1989); Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 710; 1 KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note
27, at 122.
31. See In re Caremark Int'l Inc., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996); 1
KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 27, at 77-78.
32. Section 8.30 of the Revised Model Business Corporation Act provides
the statutory approach to the duty of care that most states follow. Section 8.30
provides that directors must discharge their duties "(1) in good faith; (2) with
the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise under
similar circumstances; and (3) in a manner he reasonably believes to be in the
best interests of the corporation." REVISED MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT§ 8.30 (1985);
see also Meyers v. Moody, 693 F.2d 1196, 1209 (5th Cir. 1982); Steinberg v.
Kendig (In re Ben Franklin Retail Stores, Inc.), 225 B.R. 646, 652 (Bankr. N.D.
Ill. 1998). See generally PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 28,
§ 4.01(a) (discussing a director's duty of care).
33. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 360 (Del. 1993), modified,
636 A.2d 956 (Del. 1994); Smith, 488 A.2d at 872-73.
34. In re Caremark Int'l Inc., 698 A.2d at 967.
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outside directors) typically will have neither the time nor ability to
closely monitor the firm's daily operations or firm managers' day-to35
day decisions. Given this, directors may have no actual knowledge
of improper managerial acts, either because they have been misled
by firm managers, or because they have simply failed to detect that
managers have engaged in harmful conduct, such as causing the
firm to violate applicable laws or regulations. 36
Directors arguably breach the duty of care if they wait until a
firm is DOA before placing it under the protection of bankruptcy
laws .or if they fail to supervise firm managers who engage in acts
that cause the firm's insolvency. However, allegations that directors
breached the duty of care are reviewed under the highly deferential
business judgment rule. 37 The business judgment rule is designed to
encourage directors to freely exercise their managerial discretion
and to remove uncertainty from corporate transactions by avoiding
an ex post appraisal of the managers' decisions. 38 Under the
business judgment rule, director liability is predicated upon

35. Bainbridge, supra note 14, at 35; Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Board of
Directors and Internal Control, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 237, 237 (1997); Ira M.
Millstein & Paul W. MacAvoy, Essay, The Active Board of Directors and
Performance of the Large Publicly Traded Corporation, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1283,
1283-86 (1998).
36. To avoid breaching the duty of care for failing to prevent illegal
corporate activities, directors must generally monitor managers' acts, but need
not possess detailed information about all aspects of the firm's operation, nor
routinely interrogate all employees (unless there are grounds to suspect
deception). Directors typically satisfy the duty to monitor by assuring that the
firm has a good information and reporting system (i.e., by creating corporate
compliance programs) or by specifically delegating oversight responsibilities to
their audit or ethics committees or to third-parties acting on the firm's behalf
(and subject to the directors' control). In re Care mark Int'l Inc., 698 A.2d at 970
(finding that:
a director's obligation includes a duty to attempt in good faith to
assure that a corporate information and reporting system, which the
board concludes is adequate, exists, and that failure to do so under
some circumstances may, in theory at least, render a director liable
for losses caused by non-compliance with applicable legal standards[)].
See also Eisenberg, supra note 35, at 252 (noting that "(t]he most significant
instrument for executing" the directors' duty to monitor is internal and possibly
external auditing).
37. See Ajay Sports, Inc. v. Casazza, 1 P.3d 267, 275 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000);
Smith, 488 A.2d at 872-73.
38. Ajay Sports, Inc., 1 P.3d at 275; Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 360 ("The rule
operates to preclude a court from imposing itself unreasonably on the business
and affairs of a corporation."); Smith, 488 A.2d at 872; Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt
Chern. Corp., No 7547, 1987 Del. Ch. LEXIS 522, at *9-10 (Del. Ch. Dec. 17,
1987).
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concepts of gross negligence, not reasonableness. 39 Unless it can be
shown that the directors acted with the primary goal of
accomplishing an impermissible purpose, decisions made by
disinterested directors who used a rational, deliberately considered
process to be informed or who made a good faith effort to advance
the firm's interests typically will be shielded from liability. 40 Thus,
while shareholders theoretically can sue directors who made
decisions that harmed the firm, or who failed to act to prevent harm
(including hopeless insolvency) to the firm, the business judgment
rule ensures that successful suits against directors will be rare. 41
39. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 262-63 (Del. 2000). Gross negligence
typically is defined as "reckless indifference to or a deliberate disregard of the
whole body of stockholders or actions that are without the bounds of reason."
Potter v. Pohlad, 560 N.W.2d 389, 392 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (internal quotation
marks omitted). If the business judgment rule is not applicable, directors are
liable for simple negligence. 1 KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 27, at 84; see also
Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963) (holding that
directors "are bound to use that amount of care which ordinarily careful and
prudent men would use in similar circumstances").
40. Smith, 488 A.2d at 873; Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del.
1984), overruled on other grounds by Brehm, 746 A.2d 244. Indeed, many
scholars argue that this rule virtually eliminates liability for breaching the duty
of care as long as directors show that their decision was made on an informed
basis, in good faith and in the belief that the decision was in the firm's best
interests even if the decision is later found to have been substantively wrong,
unreasonable or irrational. See, e.g., ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAw§ 3.4
(1986) (suggesting that "the mere mention of the business judgment rule brings
smiles of relief to" directors' faces); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team
Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 299-300 (1999) ("[I]n
practice the duty of care is all but eviscerated by a legal doctrine known as the
'business judgment rule.'"); Alan R. Palmiter, Reshaping the Corporate
Fiduciary Model: A Director's Duty of Independence, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1351, 136162 (1989) ("Courts accord near-complete deference to corporate decisions
untainted by interest.").
41. Indeed, suits for all reasons by creditors or shareholders against
directors for breaching their fiduciary duties appear to be quite rare. See Lynn
M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Corporate Governance in the Bankruptcy
Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 669, 70910 (1993) [hereinafter LoPucki & Whitford, Corporate Governance]. Moreover,
largely in response to Smith v. Van Gorkom, a Delaware decision that expanded
director liability for breach of the duty of care, states quickly adopted "charter
option" statutes that allowed corporations to include exculpatory clauses in
their articles of incorporation that eliminate the personal liability of directors
for monetary damages resulting from a breach of the duty of care owed to
shareholders. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001). Directors
would remain liable for breaches of the duty of loyalty, bad faith, intentional
misconduct, knowingly violating the law, improperly paying dividends, or
engaging in transactions in which they receive an improper personal benefit.
See, e.g., id.
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b. To non-shareholders. If a firm is solvent, directors generally
42
will owe no fiduciary duties to employees or creditors and instead
must act in good faith consistent with the actual or implied
contract. 43 It is unclear how to define directors' duties to involuntary
creditors (the best example being tort creditors), since they did not
choose to have a relationship with the firm and thus cannot rely on
contractual rights. Directors are deemed not to have fiduciary
duties to non-shareholders largely because of the prevailing view
that corporations are managed by directors and officers for the sole
purpose of maximizing shareholder interests. 44 This view recently
42. Nahman v. Jacks (In re Jacks), 243 B.R. 385, 390 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.
1999) (citing California law), affd in part and rev'd in part, 266 B.R. 728 (9th
Cir. 2001); Steinberg v. Kendig (In re Ben Franklin Retail Stores, Inc.), 225 B.R.
646, 652 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1998) (citing Delaware law); In re Revco D.S., Inc.,
118 B.R. 468, 507-08 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1990) (noting Delaware courts' refusal
to recognize any fiduciary duty to creditors of solvent firms); Browning
Debenture Holders' Comm. v. DASA Corp., 454 F. Supp. 88, 104 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)
(stating that neither firm nor directors owe fiduciary duties to creditors);
Connolly v. Agostino's Ristorante, Inc., 775 So. 2d 387, 388 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2000) (citing Florida law, "the general rule is that directors do not owe creditors
duties beyond the relevant contractual terms absent 'special circumstances'
... "); Whitley v. Carolina Clinic, 118 N.C. App. 523, 526, 455 S.E.2d 896, 899
(1995) (citing North Carolina law, "[a]s a general rule, directors of a corporation
do not owe a fiduciary duty to creditors of the corporation"). But see Brandt v.
Hicks, Muse & Co. (In re Healthco Int'l, Inc.), 208 B.R. 288, 300-01 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1997) (concluding that the directors who approved a leveraged buy-out
that ultimately caused the firm to file a Chapter 7 petition had a duty to
creditors even though the decision to approve the LBO was made when the firm
was solvent), affd in part, Comm'r of Revenue v. Brandt (In re Healthco Int'l,
Inc.), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15379 (D. Mass. July 8, 2001).
43. See In re Lifschultz Fast Freight, 132 F.3d 339, 346 (7th Cir. 1997);
United States v. Jolly, 102 F.3d 46, 48 (2d Cir. 1996); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v.
RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504, 1519 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Katz v. Oak Indus.,
Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch. 1986); see also Robert Charles Clark, The
Duties of the Corporate Debtor to Its Creditors, 90 HARv L. REv. 505 (1977);
Robert S. Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith-Its Recognition and
Conceptualization, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 810 (1982); Robert S. Summers, "Good
Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REv. 195 (1968); Christopher L. Barnett, Note &
Comment, Healthco and the "Insolvency Exception": An Unnecessary Expansion
of the Doctrine?, 16 BANKR. DEV. J. 441, 441-43 (2000).
44. See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 119-20 (1991); Bernard Black & Reinier
Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109 HARv. L. REV. 1911,
1921 (1996) ("The efficiency goal of maximizing the company's value to investors
remains, in our view, the principal function of corporate law."); Bernard S.
Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520, 521 (1990)
(noting that "[i]n theory, the shareholders of public companies elect directors,
who watch corporate officers, who manage/watch the company on the

2003]

ANALYZING CORPORATE FAILURES

13

has been challenged by scholars who argue that viewing public
corporations as a bundle of privately-owned rights is unrealistic
because corporations are a community of interests. 45 These
"communitarian" scholars suggest that directors' fiduciary duties
are to the firm itself (not exclusively to shareholders) and that
directors have a duty to consider the needs and interests of nonshareholder interests (like employees, trade creditors, suppliers, and
the local community) during the decision-making process. 46
Consistent with this view, some state constituency statutes now
shield directors from liability to shareholders if they consider nonshareholder interests during the decision-making process. 47
shareholders' behalf'); Deborah A DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of
Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 917 (1988) (commenting that "the
notion that in theory a corporation's 'own' interests could diverge from those of
its shareholders is difficult to fathom"); Michael C. Jensen & William H.
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, in FOUNDATIONS OF
CORPORATE LAW 8 (Roberta Romano ed., 1993).
45. See, e.g., Blair & Stout, supra note 40, at 260-61; Daniel J.H.
Greenwood, Fictional Shareholders: For Whom Are Corporate Managers
Trustees, Revisited, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1021, 1023 (1996) (noting that
communitarians disagree with the traditional view of corporate law's primary
purpose: "to ensure that managers act as agents for the shareholder owners");
Nell Minow, Shareholders, Stakeholders, and Boards of Directors, 21 STETSON
L. REV. 197, 218 (1991) (explaining stakeholder theory of corporate law which
emphasizes duties to constituencies beyond shareholders); Marleen A
O'Connor, The Human Capital Era: Reconceptualizing Corporate Law to
Facilitate Labor-Management Cooperation, 78 CORNELL L. REv. 899, 946-65
(1993) (advocating for a "neutral referee model" where directors would serve to
balance the competing interests of employees and shareholders); cf John C.
Coffee, Jr., Unstable Coalitions: Corporate Governance As a Multi-Player Game,
78 GEO. L.J. 1495 (1990); Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the
Various Rationales for Making Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of
Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 23, 24 (1991) (emphasizing the
need for "gap-filling responsibilities" to protect the interests of non-shareholders
of a corporation); David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201,
261-62 (1990) (discussing the emergence of public interests into the law
governing corporate activity).
46. See, e.g., David Millon, Redefining Corporate Law, 24 IND. L. REV. 223,
225 (1991) (discussing constituency statutes and the new conception these laws
create about a corporation's role in society); Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical
and Practical Framework for Enforcing Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70
TEX. L. REV. 579, 582-83 (1992) (questioning the traditional notion that
"directors ought to be accountable exclusively to stockholders"); Marleen A
O'Connor, Restructuring the Corporation's Nexus of Contracts: Recognizing a
Fiduciary Duty to Protect Displaced Workers, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1189, 1203-10
(1991) (advocating for protection of employees' interests in a corporation
through a legal model of corporations where rights are defined "through a set of
explicit and implicit contracts").
47. For a list of the statutes, see Guhan Subramanian, The Influence of
Antitakeover Statutes on Incorporation Choice: Evidence on the "Race" Debate
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Regardless of whether as a normative matter directors should
act solely to maximize shareholders' interests, as a descriptive
matter, maximizing shareholder wealth remains the primary goal of
directors of American firms. In addition, there are a number of
policy and pragmatic reasons to limit directors' direct liability to
non-shareholders. First, exposing directors to increased legal
exposure from a multiplicity of potentially unfounded claims will
impede their ability to function as corporate directors and
necessarily will increase administrative costs largely because
directors may demand additional directors' and officers' ("D&O")
liability insurance to cover these additional risks. 48 Moreover,
treating non-shareholders as beneficiaries of the directors' fiduciary
duties of loyalty and care potentially could overwhelm the courts
and lead to inconsistent results since different constituents could file
suits in different jurisdictions that have divergent standards for the
directors' fiduciary duties.
Finally, giving non-shareholders
standing to sue the directors of solvent firms for the breach of a
fiduciary duty exposes directors to the risk of double liability, since
they presumably also can be sued by shareholders for breaching
those same duties.
2. Insolvent Businesses
Though directors and managers are deemed to manage an
insolvent firm's assets for the benefit of creditors and potentially
shareholders or others with an interest in the firm, 49 they have no
and Antitakeover Overreaching, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1795, 1828 tbl.3 (2002). See
also Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Employees as Stakeholders Under State
Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 21 STETSON L. REV. 45, 45 (1991) (noting
constituency statutes recognize protection for many groups including
"managers, creditors, employees, customers, suppliers, and local communities").
48. See Melanie K. Palmore, Comment, "Insured us. Insured" Exclusions in
Director and Officer Liability Insurance Policies: Is Coverage Available When
Chapter 11 Trustees and Debtors-in-Possession Sue Former Directors and
Officers?, 9 BANKR. DEV. J. 101, 102 (1992) (noting increase in D&O liability
insurance due to the rising standard of care imposed on directors).
49. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S.
343, 355 (1985) (stating that the managers of the debtor-in-possession are
fiduciaries); Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 307 (1939); Pay 'N Pak Stores v.
Court Square Capital (In re PNP Holdings Corp.), 141 F.3d 1178 (9th Cir.
1998); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Reynolds & Reynolds Co. (In re JKJ Chevrolet,
Inc.), 26 F.3d 481, 485 (4th Cir. 1994); Unsecured Creditors Comm. of Debtor
STN Enters., Inc. v. Noyes, 779 F.2d 901, 904 (2d Cir. 1985); Fed. Deposit Ins.
Corp. v. Sea Pines Co., 692 F.2d 973, 976-77 (4th Cir. 1982); Clarkson Co. v.
Shaheen, 660 F.2d 506, 512 (2d Cir. 1981); Steinberg v. Kendig, (In re Ben
Franklin Retail Stores, Inc.), 225 B.R. 646, 653-54 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1998);
Berres v. Bruning (In re Bruning), 143 B.R. 253, 255-56 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1992)
(finding that a trust arises in favor of creditors upon the firm's insolvency); Fox
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fiduciary or statutory duty to protect the firm by filing a timely
bankruptcy petition. Moreover, though directors remain fiduciaries
of the firm once it becomes insolvent and they have additional duties
to protect the interests of creditors upon the firm's insolvency, 50
there is no generally accepted definition for "insolvency."51 Courts
have defined insolvency either as a firm's inability to pay bills as
they mature in the ordinary course of the business (equitable
insolvency)52 or when the fair market value of the firm's assets is
less than its total liabilities (bankruptcy or balance sheet
insolvency). 53 Other courts suggest that directors breach their
fiduciary duties to creditors if decisions thW make when the firm is
solvent cause the firm to become insolvent. Moreover, a prominent
Delaware state court opinion suggests that directors' fiduciary
duties to creditors start before actual insolvency when the firm is
approaching insolvency, i.e., when it is in the ''vicinity of
v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 187 Cal. Rptr. 141, 143 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982); St.
James Capital Corp. v. Pallet Recycling Assocs. ofN. Am., Inc., 589 N.W.2d 511,
514-15 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999); Ass'n of Haystack Prop. Owners, Inc. v. Sprague,
494 A.2d 122, 125 (Vt. 1985); JAMES D. Cox ET AL., CORPORATIONS§ 10.18 (1995)
(discussing body of law that imposes on directors fiduciary duties to creditors
when the firm is insolvent).
50. Directors of insolvent firms are deemed to have fiduciary duties to
creditors because shareholders' residual interests in an insolvent firm are
worthless and cannot be paid until creditors' claims are paid in full. See
Christopher W. Frost, The Theory, Reality and Pragmatism of Corporate
Governance in Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 103, 107-08
(1998); Laura Lin, Shift of Fiduciary Duty upon Corporate Insolvency: Proper
Scope of Directors' Duty to Creditors, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1512 (1993).
51. See, e.g., Ramesh K.S. Rao et al., Fiduciary Duty a la Lyonnais: An
Economic Perspective on Corporate Governance in a Financially-Distressed
Firm, 22 J. CORP. L. 53, 61 (1996); Andrew D. Shaffer, Corporate FiduciaryInsolvent: The Fiduciary Relationship Your Corporate Law Professor (Should
Have) Warned You About, 8 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 479, 513 (2000).
52. LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. Perelman, 82 F. Supp. 2d 279, 290 (D. Del. 2000).
53. Geyer v. Ingersoll Publ'ns Co., 621 A.2d 784, 789 (Del. Ch. 1992).
Statutes provide yet more definitions. The Bankruptcy Code defines an
insolvent debtor as one whose debts exceed the fair market value of its
property. 11 U.S.C. § 101(32) (1994). The Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act
defines insolvency to occur when the debtor's present fair salable value of assets
is less than the amount required to pay its probable liability on its existing
debts as they mature. UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT§ 2(1) (1992). The
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act defines insolvency to occur when the debtor's
debts exceed the fair valuation of the debtor's assets and presumes a debtor is
insolvent when it is generally not paying its debts as they become due. UNIF.
FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT§ 2(a)-(b) (1999). The lack of a generally accepted
method to value the assets or liabilities adds even another layer of
unpredictability. Rao et al., supra note 51, at 63 (noting lack of consensus on
appropriate measure to value assets or liabilities).
54. Sea Pines Co., 692 F.2d at 977; Clarkson Co., 660 F.2d at 512.
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insolvency."55 Finally, courts recently have been willing to allow
creditors to sue directors and officers based on a theory of
"deepening insolvency." Under this theory, directors, officers, their
accountants or lawyers who negligently or fraudulently extend an
insolvent company's life by concealing or misrepresenting the
company's true state of insolvency may be held liable to the firm's
creditors. 56
In addition to the uncertainty concerning the meaning of
"insolvency," there is a breadth of views concerning the scope of
directors' post-insolvency fiduciary duties. 57 Some courts and
commentators narrowly characterize directors' duties as the
traditional pre-insolvency duties (duty of care and duty of loyalty)

55. Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp.,
No. 12150, 1991 WL 277613, at *34 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991).
56. See, e.g., Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co.,
267 F.3d 340 (3d Cir. 2001); Tabas v. Greenleaf Ventures, Inc. (In re Flagship
Healthcare, Inc.), 269 B.R. 721 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2001); Steinberg v. Kendig (In
re Ben Franklin Retail Stores, Inc.), 225 B.R. 646, 655 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1998).
The deepening insolvency cause of action is similar to the liability imposed on
directors of non-U.S. firms who cause a business to trade while insolvent. See
Australian Companies Act, 1993, § 588G (Austl.); Insolvency Act, 1986, §§ 21314, 247 (Eng.).
57. Courts are also split over whether the business judgment rule shields
directors from liability for creditors' breach of fiduciary claims. Compare
Comm. of the Creditors of Xonics Med. Sys., Inc. v. Haverty (In re Xonics, Inc.),
99 B.R. 870, 876 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989) (applying the rule), with Mims v.
Kennedy Capital Mgmt., Inc. (In re Performance Nutrition, Inc.), 239 B.R. 93,
111 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1999) (refusing to apply the rule), and Askanse v. Fatjo,
No. H-91-3140, 1993 WL 208440 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 22, 1993) (same), affd, 130
F.3d 657 (5th Cir. 1997). If the duty applies, decisions the directors made
during the firm's insolvency presumably will be deemed to have been taken in
good faith as long as the directors were adequately informed and utilized a
rational decision-making process.
For a general discussion of directors' duties, see Daniel B. Bogart,
Unexpected Gifts of Chapter 11: The Breach of a Director's Duty of Loyalty
Following Plan Confirmation and the Postconfirmation Jurisdiction of
Bankruptcy Courts, 72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 303, 310-13 (1998) [hereinafter Bogart,
Unexpected Gifts]; Daniel B. Bogart, Liability of Directors of Chapter 11 Debtors
in Possession: "Don't Look Back-Something May Be Gaining On You," 68 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 155 (1994); Richard M. Cieri et al., The Fiduciary Duties of
Directors of Financially Troubled Companies, 3 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 405
(1994); Carlos J. Cuevas, The Myth of Fiduciary Duties in Corporate
Reorganization Cases, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 385 (1998); Harvey R. Miller,
Corporate Governance in Chapter 11: The Fiduciary Relationship Between
Directors and Stockholders of Solvent and Insolvent Corporations, 23 SETON
HALL L. REv. 1467 (1993); Robert B. Millner, What Does it Mean for Directors of
Financially Troubled Corporations to Have Fiduciary Duties to Creditors?, 9 J.
BANKR. L. & PRAC. 201 (1999); Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking a Corporation's
Obligations to Creditors, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 647 (1996); Shaffer, supra note 51.
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owed to shareholders, 58 others suggest that directors have only
contractual duties (duty of good faith and fair dealing) to creditors, 59
while others suggest that directors are required only to act legally
and not "divert, dissipate or unduly risk [the firm's] assets.',so
Where there are allegations of fraud, self-dealing or preferential
treatment, a director's liability to creditors is less ambiguous. 61 In
addition, directors who make either fraudulent 62 or preferential63
58. See, e.g., Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U.S. 267, 274 (1951) (discussing
prohibition against trustees allowing insiders to engage in self-interested
trading); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Weaver, 680 F.2d 451, 461 (6th Cir. 1982)
(discussing fiduciary duties of due care). Most courts and commentators
assume that directors' state law fiduciary duties continue during the
bankruptcy case. See Comm. of Creditors Holding Unsecured Claims v. Citicorp
Venture Capital, Ltd. (In re Papercraft Corp.), 187 B.R. 486, 498-500 (Bankr.
W.D. Pa. 1995); In re Harp, 166 B.R. 740, 746 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1993). Because
the federal Bankruptcy Code does not prescribe the duties, the duties could be
based on state corporate law or federal common law. See generally Bogart,
Unexpected Gifts, supra note 57, at 309-10 (discussing directors' fiduciary duties
in Chapter 11 proceedings); C.R. Bowles, Jr. & Nancy B. Rapoport, Has the
DIP's Attorney Become the Ultimate Creditors' Layer in Bankruptcy
Reorganization Cases?, 5 AM. BANKR. lNST. L. REV. 47, 53-54 (1997).
59. See Ann E. Conaway Stilson, Reexamining the Fiduciary Paradigm at
Corporate Insolvency and Dissolution: Defining Directors' Duties to Creditors, 20
DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 6, 92 (1995) (arguing that the duty to creditors should be
rejected because creditors are adequately protected by contract and commercial
law or by the common law of fraud).
60. Steinberg, 225 B.R. at 656; see also St. James Capital Corp. v. Pallet
Recycling Assocs. of N. Am., Inc., 589 N.W.2d 511, 516 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999)
(stating that directors do not have a duty to creditors to "minimize any loss that
may occur as a result of the corporation's insolvency" because to impose such a
duty would allow creditors "to interfere unduly and interject themselves in the
day-to-day management ofthe corporation").
61. For example, a director/shareholder who pays himself a salary, but
neglects to pay creditors' debts, breaches his fiduciary duty to creditors. Pepper
v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 307-08 (1939). Similarly, directors who prolong a firm's
corporate life by incurring debt based on misleading financial information and
causing the firm to sink deeper into insolvency breach their fiduciary duties to
creditors. Steinberg, 225 B.R. at 656. Moreover, directors consistently are
deemed to have breached their duties to creditors if they withdraw
substantially all assets from the firm without leaving sufficient resources to pay
the firm's debts, dissipate assets, put firm assets at risk, or if they divert firm
assets to themselves, other insiders, or preferred creditors. See Pierce v. United
States, 255 U.S. 398, 402 (1921); Steinberg, 225 B.R. at 655.
62. 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1994). Transfers made within one year of the
bankruptcy filing can be avoided under Section 548 of the Code. Id. Transfers
that were made more than one year pre-petition can be avoided under state law
fraudulent conveyance statutes using the trustee's avoiding powers provided in
11 u.s.c. § 544(b).
63. Id. § 547. Transfers to outside creditors may be avoided if they were
made within ninety days of the filing, whereas transfers to insiders may be
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payments to themselves before the bankruptcy filing can be forced to
return those payments to the firm's bankruptcy estate64 if the firm
ultimately files a bankruptcy petition. 65
In addition to the uncertainty concerning the meaning of
"insolvency," and the scope of directors' post-insolvency fiduciary
duties, it is unclear whether the directors' fiduciary duties (however
defined) to creditors replaces or is coextensive with a duty to
shareholders. 66 Requiring directors to consider the interests of both

avoided for a longer period of time, up to a year before the filing. Id. § 547(b)(4).
64. The commencement of the case creates a bankruptcy estate that
consists of the debtor's property wherever located. Id. § 541.
65. The debtor-in-possession ("DIP") or Trustee can recover property that
the firm improperly transferred to others, including directors, managers, or
preferred creditors. If the firm transferred property directly to directors or the
directors benefited from transfers of firm property to third-parties, the directors
can be forced to return either the property or the value of the transferred
property to the bankruptcy estate because the trustee has the right to recover a
preferential transfer from either the actual transferee or the person who
benefited from the transfer. Id. § 550. However, even if the director voluntarily
made the transfer to a third-party, the DIP or Trustee is limited to recovering
the fraudulently or preferentially transferred funds from the transferee/thirdparty unless the director personally benefited from the transfer.
66. Some courts believe that upon insolvency, directors and officers no
longer represent the stockholders. See Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Sea Pines Co.,
692 F.2d 973, 977 (4th Cir. 1982); Hovis v. Powers Constr. Co. (In re Hoffman
Assocs., Inc.), 194 B.R. 943, 964 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1995). Others believe directors
have duties to both creditors and shareholders upon insolvency. See Sanford
Fork & Tool Co. v. Howe, Brown and Co., 157 U.S. 312, 316-19 (1895); Ed Peters
Jewelry Co. v. C & J Jewelry Co., 124 F.3d 252, 276 (1st Cir. 1997) (claiming
directors owe a duty of loyalty to both shareholders and creditors after the firm
is insolvent); Butler v. Bantz (In re Howe Grain, Inc.), 209 B.R. 496, 499 (Bankr.
D. Neb. 1997); Value Prop. Trust v. Zim Co. (In re Mortgage & Realty Trust),
195 B.R. 740, 750-51 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1996); Comm. of the Creditors ofXonics
Med. Sys., Inc. v. Haverty (In re Xonics, Inc.), 99 B.R. 870, 872 (Bankr. N.D. Ill
1989).
Some courts and commentators view creditors as the true "owners" of a
bankruptcy firm, see Kham & Nate's Shoes No.2, Inc. v. First Bank, 908 F.2d
1351, 1360 (7th Cir. 1990), and some academic scholars have argued that
Chapter 11 should be used only to protect creditors' interests because they
replace shareholders as the residual stakeholders upon a firm's insolvency. See,
e.g., Barry E. Adler, A Theory of Corporate Insolvency, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 343,
362-63 (1997); Frost, supra note 50, at 114-15; see also Lin, supra note 50, at
1512 (commenting that the fiduciary duties owed to creditors when a
corporation is insolvent can arguably be construed broadly to maximize the
creditor's interest or narrowly to merely require the equal treatment of
creditors); LoPucki & Whitford, Corporate Governance, supra note 41, at 709
(suggesting that managers should have fiduciary duties to both creditors and
shareholders "until their claims or interests are extinguished"); David Arthur
Skeel, Jr., The Nature and Effect of Corporate Voting in Chapter 11
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shareholders and creditors potentially creates an irreconcilable
conflict given the divergent interests shareholders and creditors
have once the firm is either in the ''vicinity of insolvency'' or is
insolvent. Because creditors are entitled to receive no more than the
amount of debt owed them, they will want directors to avoid risky
business decisions that might save the business, but if unsuccessful
will likely dissipate the firm's remaining assets. They are not
entitled to any "upside" in benefits the firm reaps from risky (but
successful) actions and, thus, will prefer that directors avoid those
risky activities even if high-risk activities may reap tremendous
financial benefits for the firm. 67 In contrast, shareholders' interests
in an insolvent firm are worthless because their interests will be
paid only after all creditors have been paid. 66
Given this,
shareholders have an incentive to encourage directors to engage in
risky behavior to resuscitate the firm because they capture all the
higher returns, but are protected on the downside because of their
limited liability to the firm's creditors. 69
To some extent, directors already are required to consider dual
interests as they are prohibited from making distributions to
stockholders if doing so would render the corporation insolvent or
leave it with unreasonably small capital. 70 However, even if
directors of insolvent or near-insolvent firms understand that they
have a fiduciary duty to protect non-shareholder claims or interests,
they also understand that even (perhaps especially) during a firm's
insolvency, shareholders retain the right to compel annual meetings
and vote to replace them as directors. 71 Though some scholars argue

Reorganization Cases, 78 VA. L. REV. 461, 500 (1992) (noting that "as the
fortunes of a bankrupt firm rise or fall during the course of a chapter 11 case,
the firm's residual owner could change" and remarking that it is unclear "when
or how the decisionmaking class should be chosen").
67. See generally EASTERBOOK & FISCHEL, supra note 44, at 69; Schwarcz,
supra note 57, at 666-67 (discussing the differences between the rights and
incentives of shareholders and creditors of a solvent corporation).
68. Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations
and the Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate
Protection of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 97, 106-07
(1984) (discussing conflicting interests of secured creditors, junior creditors, and
shareholders).
69. See Frost, supra note 50, at 106.
70. See Brandt v. Hicks, Muse & Co. (In re Healthco, Int'l, Inc.), 208 B.R.
288, 301 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1997) (rejecting the argument that requiring
directors to consider the interests of both groups creates irreconcilable conflict),
affd in part, Comm'r of Revenue v. Brandt (In re Healthco Int'l, Inc.), 2001 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 15379 (D. Mass. July 8, 2001).
71. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 141(k), 216(3), 223 (2001); see also Saxon
Indus., Inc. v. NKFW Partners, 488 A.2d 1298, 1300 (Del. 1984).
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that these are phantom "rights" for shareholders of public
corporations (because management often controls the outcome of
shareholder votes), 72 directors nonetheless may feel conflicting
loyalties upon the firm's insolvency and current law does not clearly
explain how directors could simultaneously protect those potentially
conflicting interests. 73
3. Conclusion
Although directors have the authority to place a firm under the
protection of federal bankruptcy laws, they have no explicit duty to
either file a bankruptcy petition on behalf of an insolvent firm or
refrain from filing one. Despite the ambiguity concerning the scope
of directors' duties to creditors, 74 no court has ever suggested that
directors breach those duties by failing to file an early bankruptcy
petition or that directors should be held liable for placing a DOA
firm in bankruptcy. If directors are unrealistically optimistic about
their ability to save the financially troubled firm, or they want to
avoid the harm to shareholder (or their own) equity interests in the
firm, existing legal rules give directors no incentive to protect the
firm's community of interest by filing a bankruptcy petition sooner
rather than later. With no clear duty to protect the interests of the
72. See Blair & Stout, supra note 40, at 310-11; David Millon, New Game
Plan or Business As Usual? A Critique of the Team Production Model of
Corporate Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1001, 1018 (2000) ("[M]anagement determines
the outcome of the annual election and typically gets its way on other
shareholder votes too.").
73. In Commodity Futures Trading Commission u. Weintraub, 471 U.S.
343, 355 (1985), the Supreme Court noted that shareholder interests must be
subordinated to creditor interests, but did not delineate the nature of the duties
directors owed creditors. See also In re Cent. Ice Cream Co., 836 F.2d 1068,
1072-73 (7th Cir. 1987) (agreeing that the debtor's primary duty was to ensure
sufficient assets to pay creditor claims, but also considered the shareholders'
interests in being paid).
74. In addition to having potentially conflicting duties to creditors and
shareholders, Trustees and DIPs potentially have intra-creditor conflicting
duties during a bankruptcy case. Managers, who have an incentive to keep
their jobs, will not want to dispose of a significant amount of the firm's assets
even if the disposition might be in the best interest of the firm and its creditors.
Thus, they are likely to give more favorable treatment to creditors who will not
demand that they sell substantial portions of the firm or its assets. Similarly,
managers have an incentive to favor creditors (like trade creditors or suppliers)
who are likely to support keeping the firm intact (and retaining the current
managers) even though the Trustee/DIP should treat all similarly-situated
creditors alike. See Martin J. Bienenstock, Conflicts Between Management and
the Debtor In Possession's Fiduciary Duties, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 543, 544-46
(1992) (discussing incentives that affect managers' negotiations during Chapter
11 reorganizations).
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firm (and its constituents) upon insolvency, directors understand
that they face little risk of liability if they harm the firm by their
decision to file (or not to file) a bankruptcy petition for the firm. 75
Current fiduciary duties give directors no incentives to avoid
DOA filings. Creating additional liability for directors who fail to
file timely bankruptcy petitions would not be warranted, however, if
non-legal controls give directors an incentive to avoid DOA filings.
As the next section demonstrates, however, existing market controls
fail to give directors an incentive to file timely bankruptcy petitions.
Market Restraints Fail to Curb Directors' Selflnterested
Opportunistic Behavior
In theory, existing market restraints (such as product markets,
capital markets, and the market for corporate control) will contain
directorial opportunistic acts and induce directors to make decisions
(including avoiding DOA filings) that are in the best interests of the
business. 76 Rational manager/directors would not consistently and
intentionally make harmful business decisions because, according to

B.

75. Notwithstanding the general understanding that directors have
fiduciary duties to creditors during the firm's bankruptcy proceeding and that
they must pay creditor claims before distributing property to owners, directors'
fiduciary duties during bankruptcy cases are murky as well. See, e.g.,
Weintraub, 471 U.S. at 355 (stating that the debtor-in-possession owes a
fiduciary duty to stockholders, yet failing to explain how to reconcile this duty
with the fiduciary duties owed creditors); Casco N. Bank v. DN Assocs. (In re
DN Assocs.), 144 B.R. 195, 199 (Bankr. D. Me. 1992) (allowing counsel to be
compensated from the bankruptcy estate despite the creditors' claim that
counsel was working to advance interests adverse to the estate). Although the
"absolute priority" rule requires that creditors be paid in full before equity,
empirical research suggests that debtors can circumvent that requirement. See
Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Bargaining Over Equity's Share in the
Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. PA. L.
REv. 125, 166-67 (1990).
Moreover, despite the latest Supreme Court
pronouncement on the absolute priority rule, it still remains possible that old
equity can contribute new value to the reorganized firm and retain its equity
position. See Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P'ship,
526 U.S. 434, 454-58 (1999) (declining to decide whether the new value
exception to the absolute priority rule exists, but holding that plans cannot
grant equity interests for former owners if only old equity is allowed to propose
a reorganization plan or compete for the equity).
Indeed, recovering fraudulent or preferential transfers is probably the
greatest risk directors face in their firms' bankruptcies. See generally Clarkson
Co. v. Shaheen, 660 F.2d 506, 512-13 (2d Cir. 1981); Rosebud Corp. v. Boggio,
561 P.2d 367, 372-73 (Colo. Ct. App. 1977) (director liable to creditor for not
preventing officer-director from selling insolvent corporation and converting
proceeds to himselfto the detriment of corporate creditor).
76. See Cohen, supra note 25, at 352-53; LoPucki & Whitford, Corporate
Governance, supra note 41, at 710-12; Rao et al., supra note 51, at 56.
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the corporate control market theory, shareholders who are unhappy
with those decisions will either sell their shares or call an annual
meeting to replace them. 77 In addition, directors who make decisions
that consistently harm their firms will so weaken the firm that it
will become an easy take-over target (which also might lead to their
removal as directors). Directors (especially inside directors) also
have an incentive to act only in the firm's best interest because,
according to the labor market theory, being associated with a board
of an insolvent or bankrupt firm will cause reputational harm and
affect their future employment prospects. 78 Likewise, because the
salary of inside directors often is based on the firm's profitability,
directors have an incentive to avoid making decisions that cause the
firm to become insolvent. 79
Directors also have an incentive to make decisions that are in
the best interest of the firm because of certain social status
influences. Specifically, directors of successful firms often are
recognized and commended in the popular press, often on a
published list of the ''best" or ''worst" boards. 80 Receiving positive
recognition both enhances the director's self-esteem and also leads
to potentially more lucrative social or professional opportunities.
While directors of large businesses do not derive their principal
income from director's fees, fees and benefits for serving on the
boards of major companies can exceed one hundred thousand dollars
annually. 81 The risk of losing this income arguably causes directors
77. In decisions involving breaches of the duty of care, courts imply that
shareholders who object to a rational decision made by a director lack the right
to sue the director for breach of the duty of care. Instead, their sole remedy is
to elect other directors. In re Caremark, Int'l Inc., 698 A.2d 959, 968 (Del. Ch.
1996).
78. See Cohen, supra note 25, at 352.
79. Id.
80. Matthew Boyle, The Dirty Half-Dozen: America's Worst Boards,
FORTUNE, May 14, 2001, at 249, 249; John A. Byrne, The Best and the Worst
Boards, Bus. WK., Jan. 24, 2000, at 142, 142 (including a table of both the best
and worst corporate boards); Louis Lavelle, The Best & Worst Boards: How the
Corporate Scandals Are Sparking a Revolution in Governance, Bus. WK., Oct. 7,
2002, at 104, 104. Ironically, in 2000, the Chief Executive magazine ranked
Enron's board among the top five boards. Editorial, 'Yes Men' Make up Boards
that Miss Enron-type Failings, USA TODAY, Feb. 21, 2002, at A16 [hereinafter
Yes Men].
81. Enron directors were paid in excess of three to four hundred thousand
dollars in cash and stock in 2001. Reed Abelson, Enron's Collapse: The
Directors; One Inquiry Suggests Board Played Important Role, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
19, 2002, at C1 [hereinafter Abelson, Enron's Collapse]; Yes Men, supra note 80,
at A16. Other firms had similar (sometimes significantly higher) compensation
plans for their directors. See Gary Strauss, Corporate Perks Add Zing to Juicy
Jobs on Boards: Free Products, Services Help Sweeten the Pot, USA TODAY, Apr.
17, 2000, at B3 (reporting $645,700 annual fee to Microsoft directors, $386,320
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to make decisions that will ensure that they remain on the current
board and are asked to serve on future boards. 82 Thus, to the extent
that directors value prestige and status, they will avoid making
decisions that might embarrass them and harm their social esteem.
For several reasons, market controls generally will not curb
directorial misconduct-especially when firms face financial crises.
First, market controls are inadequate controls because not all
markets are efficient and information is not always transparent. 83
Moreover, even if market controls discourage directors from making
decisions that cause the firm's insolvency, the "final period" problem
will make managers indifferent to market controls once the firm
becomes insolvent. The final period problem arises when a person
fears that she is about to lose her job and senses that she will be
unable to secure equal or better employment. 84 Once the firm
becomes insolvent, the final period bias will give directors
(especially inside directors) an incentive to engage in high-risk
activities to save the firm since they may know (or at least suspect)
that their future financial opportunities are limited. That is, inside
directors of insolvent firms will want to delay filing a bankruptcy
petition for the firm since most will know (or at least suspect) they
will be replaced if the firm files for bankruptcy. 85 Similarly, given
the reputational harm that inside directors may suffer because of
the public scrutiny of their conduct, they will seek to delay the filing
if they believe they are unlikely to have future opportunities to serve
as managers oflarge firms. 86
Since many outside directors are shareholders, they also will
have an incentive to delay a filing if they suspect that their equity
interests will be eliminated by a bankruptcy filing. Indeed, as the
to Dell directors, and $341,900 to Goldman Sachs directors).
82. Gary Strauss, Do Conflicts Cloud the Objectivity of Corporate Boards?;
Critics Say Side Deals Can Compromise Watchdog Duties, USA TODAY, Mar. 5,
2002, at Al.
83. See, e.g., Dierdre A. Burgman & Paul N. Cox, Corporate Directors,
Corporate Realities, and Deliberative Process: An Analysis of the Trans Union
Case, 11 J. CORP. L. 311, 354-58 (1996); Cohen, supra note 25, at 352; Michael
C. Jensen, Presidential Address: The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and
the Failure of Internal Control Systems, 48 J. FIN. 831, 851-53 (1985).
84. Mitu Gulati, When Corporate Managers Fear a Good Thing Is Coming
to an End: The Case of Interim Nondisclosure, 46 UCLA L. REV. 675, 694 (1999).
85. See infra note 86.
86. For example, given the taint associated with them, one wonders what
major corporation would be willing to hire Kenneth Lay (the now disgraced
former Chief Executive Officer ("CEO") and Board Chair of Enron) or Andrew
Fastow (Enron's former Chief Financial Officer ("CFO") who appeared to be the
principal organizer and beneficiary of Enron's use of off-the-book accounting
practices).
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Enron case demonstrates,· directors' economic incentives to protect
their own pecuniary interests (by, for example, exercising stock
options and selling stock) will discourage them from filing a
bankruptcy petition for the firm at least until after they have
protected those interests. 57 If the short-term monetary gains from
delaying a filing are great, directors will conclude that those gains
are worth any potential reputational harm.
Finally, some scholars suggest that increased director liability
is unnecessary because directors typically make decisions that are in
the firm's best interest because of corporate cultural norms of
fairness and trust. 88 Directors who intentionally cause harm to
businesses arguably will be "sanctioned" by feelings of guilt or
shame, or will be shunned by their peers if they violate those
cultural norms. 89 While that may be true in some instances, given
the potential of enormous profits (like those in the Enron case), 90 it

87. Enron's directors netted billions by strategically exerc1smg stock
options then selling shares. The Enron directors' selling activities appear to
have been triggered by the directors' knowledge that Enron was insolvent (and
would need to be placed in bankruptcy), that their investments would be
worthless in the subsequent bankruptcy, and that they might be forced to
resign in the bankruptcy. See Michael Duffy, What Did They Know and ...
When Did They Know It?, TIME, Jan. 28, 2002, at 16, 16. Specifically, from 1999
through mid-2001, insiders received $1.1 billion by selling approximately 17.3
million Enron shares. Leslie Wayne, Before Debacle, Enron Insiders Cashed in
$1.1 Billion in Shares, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2002, at Bl. During this period, a
director and former Enron executive received almost eighty million dollars for
1.4 million shares and another director sold one million shares for over seventyfive million dollars. Id. Though claiming the sales were unrelated to Enron's
growing financial problems, Lay personally sold 1.8 million shares between
1999 and July 2001, and purportedly realized a gain of $123.4 million from
exercising stock options in 2000. Peter Behr, Enron CEO Says No to $60.6
Million, WASH. POST, Nov. 14, 2001, at E1; Floyd Norris & David Barboza,
Enron's Many Strands: Ex-Chairman's Finances; Lay Sold Shares for $100
Million, N.Y. TIMES, Feb 16, 2002, at A1; Wayne, supra, at Bl. Similarly, in
August 2001 Lay sold a total of $16.1 million in Enron stock and Jeffrey
Skilling (whom Lay replaced as president and Chief Executive Officer) netted
$15.5 million from sales of stock. Duffy, supra, at 16. J. Clifford Baxter (a
former Enron executive and vice-chair of the board who quit in 2001) cashed in
thirty-five million dollars in stock options. Paul Duggan & Peter Behr, ExEnron Executive Found Dead in Car; Police Say Gun, Note Point to Suicide,
WASH. POST, Jan. 26, 2002, at Al. Baxter had expressed concerns about
Enron's accounting practices and was considered a crucial witness by
committees investigating Enron. Id. He committed suicide on January 25,
2002. Id.
88. Blair & Stout, supra note 40, at 316.
89. David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV.
1811, 1821 (2001).
90. See supra note 81.
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is questionable whether any norm will effectively prevent directors
from taking (or refraining from taking) actions that harm the firm, if
the financial benefit of betraying their firms substantially outweighs
91
the costs associated with violating those norms.
It is likely that most directors will remain wedded both to their
confidence about their ability to save a financially troubled firm and
to their belief that their prior decisions remain valid. Neither
existing legal rules and duties, nor market norms give directors an
incentive to seek outside help or information to challenge their belief
that they have the ability to save the firm from insolvency. Given
this, a legal rule is needed to protect firms from overly confident
directors.

IV.

PROPOSED LIABILITY FOR THE F AlLURE TO TIMELY FILE

A

Justifications for the Duty
Imposing a penalty for failing to cede control of the firm to the
bankruptcy court should discourage directors' overly optimistic
decisions and, instead, encourage them to consider the realistic longterm viability of the firm. As noted in the next section, imposing a
duty to file a timely bankruptcy petition would help discourage
systematically overconfident directors by forcing them to admit at a
much earlier point that they cannot save the firm, that the firm
cannot avoid insolvency, and that the firm should be placed under
the protection of the bankruptcy court. 92

1.
A Clear Legal Rule Will Give Directors an Incentive to Seek
Outside Advice
As the Enron case illustrates, even financially sophisticated
directors often fail to understand the strategic or financial risks
facing their firms. 93 If directors believe that they made (or
approved) the decisions that caused the firm's financial difficulties,
they are unlikely to be willing to make a realistic appraisal of any
91. See Blair & Stout, supra note 40, at 318-19 (questioning effectiveness of
trust and integrity to prevent directors from behaving in opportunistic ways).
92. See infra Parts IV.A.1-3.
93. Enron's directors failed to prevent the accounting irregularities that
ultimately led to the downfall of this firm notwithstanding the directors'
impeccable credentials. Directors included Wendy Graham (former Chair of the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission and wife of Sen. Phil Gramm); Lord
John Wakekkham (a former leader of the Houses of Commons and Lords);
William C. Powers, Jr. (the Dean of the Texas Law School); Raymond S.
Trougbh (a financial consultant); Robert K. Jaedicke (the former Dean of
Stanford's Business School); and, Paulo Ferraz Pereira (a former bank
president). Abelson, Enron's Collapse, supra note 81, at Cl.
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action that questions the wisdom of their prior decisions. Similarly,
if directors are overconfident about their abilities to save the firm
and are generally incapable of admitting that their past decisions
are no longer in the best interests of the firm, only an external
influence will convince them that drastic measures (including,
potentially a bankruptcy filing) are needed to save the firm.
Moreover, if the board is both overconfident and fairly cohesive, they
are likely to engage in "groupthink"-an adaptive response where
people tend to close ranks and cling to a collegial status quo when
confronted with challenges to the group's solidarity. 94
Directors who suspect the firm is in the vicinity of insolvency,
but are unsure whether the firm is actually insolvent, should seek
the advice of external financial experts (like investment bankers or
risk managers), or appoint a committee of the board that consists of
completely independent directors who have financial management
or accounting expertise. 95 Indeed, unless one of the directors has
this specialized knowledge, a board would benefit from the services
of an external expert who-in addition to forcing directors to
reconsider their prior decisions-could provide a range of insolvency
advice. 96 Directors who know they have a duty to file a timely
bankruptcy petition will be more likely to seek and rely on the
advice of financial or turnaround experts (or to insist that a director
with this type of expertise be added to the board). Knowing ex ante
the potential liability they face if they fail to carefully monitor
manager's actions will cause directors to be more critical of their
prior decisions and will make them more likely to protect the firm's
community of interests, not just their interest in convincing
themselves that they can save the firm or that their prior decisions
continue to be sound. Directors already seek the advice of
94. Bainbridge, supra note 14, at 32.
95. See Helen S. Scott, The SEC, the Audit Committee Rules, and the
Marketplaces: Corporate Governance and the Future, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 549, 55766 (2001) (discussing proposed SEC regulations that require directors to
maintain an audit committee composed of independent directors who are
financially literate and have at least one member with management or
accounting expertise). While Enron's board created a committee to examine
Enron's relationship with the Fastow partnerships, the committee had inherent
conflicts of interests as all members of the committee (except one) were involved
with creating the partnerships or had already reviewed the transactions. See
Abelson, Enron's Collapse, supra note 81, at Cl.
96. This advice could include methods for restructuring operations,
creating a new capital structure, helping to stem the flow of losses, engaging
competent management or retraining existing managers, and helping the
directors develop a feasible and profitable business plan. See, e.g., Ron. Conrad
B. Duberstein, Out-of-court Workouts, 1 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 347, 356
(1993).
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investment bankers when considering whether a merger or takeover
is "fair" financially and they rely on that fairness opinion to avoid
liability if sued for a breach of fiduciary duty. 97 Similarly, it is not
uncommon for companies who are seeking additional capital or are
in merger discussions to obtain "solvency opinions."98
Imposing a duty to timely file should also encourage directors to
more closely monitor managers, especially managers who encourage
them to approve risky or questionable practices. 99 The duty would
encourage the directors of firms who are facing a financial crisis to
carefully scrutinize all financial information they receive from
officers, especially if the officers appear reluctant to provide full
information. Officers, like directors, likely will be concerned about
their reputation and may be more reluctant to accurately portray
the firm's finances if they fear that an accurate portrait may
jeopardize their compensation or tenure with the firm. Imposing
liability on directors who fail to protect the firm from a DOA
bankruptcy filing should help bridge the inherent information
disparity between the firm officers and the board by giving them an
incentive to demand that the firm's managers give them detailed
financial information to help them ascertain the true nature of the
firm's financial condition.
Finally, as a practical matter, directors should routinely consult
outside experts when managers ask them to approve irregular or
suspicious financial reporting procedures like those used in
Enron ~specially if they are financially unsophisticated and,
100

97. See Helen M. Bowers, Fairness Opinions and the Business Judgment
Rule: An Empirical Investigation of Target Firms' Use of Fairness Opinions, 96
N.W.U. L. REV. 567, 569-70 (2002); William J. Carney, Fairness Opinions: How
Fair Are They and Why We Should Do Nothing About It, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 523,
525 (1992) ("It is more useful to think of fairness opinions as assuring the
continued application of the business judgment rule during an era when it has
been under severe attack.").
98. See Bayer Corp. v. Mascotech, Inc. (In re Autostyle Plastics, Inc.), 269
F.3d 726, 734 (6th Cir. 2001) (discussing "solvency opinion" that induced sale of
half of the stock of a company); Brandt v. Hicks, Muse & Co. (In re Healthco
Int'l, Inc.), 208 B.R. 288, 299 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1997) (discussing "solvency
letter" prepared by appraisal firm during merger discussions), affd in part,
Comm'r of Revenue v. Brandt (In re Healthco Int'l, Inc.), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15379 (D. Mass. July 8, 2001).
99. Directors are highly deferential toward the firm's officers and tend not
to carefully monitor the officers unless there is some type of crisis. See, e.g., JAY
W. LORSCH & ELIZABETH MACIVER, PAWNS OR POTENTATES: THE REALITY OF
AMERICA's CORPORATE BOARDS 41-49 (1989). Directors are especially unlikely to
conclude that the officers have engaged in misconduct if the directors selected
or decided to retain the officers, since that concession necessarily would place
some of the blame on the directors. See Langevoort, supra note 7, at 811.
100. Of course, Enron's directors now contend that they approved of Enron's
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thus, prone to engage in ''herd behavior" by deferring to
management decisions. 101
Though the board should not be
discouraged from having a trusting relationship with the firm's
officers, 102 directors must avoid the groupthink phenomenon, since it
will encourage politeness and courtesy but discourage necessary
. ht103
overs1g
.
2.
Creating an Explicit Duty to Timely File Will Clarify
Directors' Fiduciary Obligations Once the Firm Is Insolvent
Another benefit of imposing a duty to timely file is that it will
help clarify directors' existing duties to firm constituents once the
firm is insolvent. Imposing the duty to timely file is consistent with
the communitarian view of the firm because it will clarify that
directors must consider the interests of all firm constituents
(creditors, shareholders, employees, etc.) upon the firm's
insolvency. 104 While virtually all courts and academic commentators
agree that Chapter 11 reorganizations are designed to benefit
creditors, 105 many also believe that the debate about the efficiency or
questionable accounting practices only because Enron's accounting firm, Arthur
Andersen, failed to inform the board that the practices were improper. See
Reed Abelson, Enron's Many Strands: The Directors; Enron's Board Quickly
Ratified Far-Reaching Management Moues, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2002, at C6
[hereinafter Abelson, Enron's Board). It is quite likely that the directors will
rely on this alleged misinformation to both defend against charges levied
against them, and also to seek reimbursement from Andersen of any liability
they incur.
101. Another behavioral trait-herd behavior-causes decisionmakers to
ignore their information or judgment and instead imitate the actions of others.
Bainbridge, supra note 14, at 28 (discussing herd behavior in making board
decisions). Given this tendency, it is probably best for directors to routinely
seek external assistance when they are asked to approve unusual financial
transactions. Doing so will avoid a future claim that the directors (especially
the members of the audit committee) lacked competence to adequately consider
the transaction. See Scott, supra note 95, at 564-65 (discussing criticisms of
SEC rules concerning the qualifications of audit committee members).
102. While it is unclear whether board friendships threaten board
independence and pose harm to shareholder interests, it is clear that unduly
adversarial relationships between boards and firm officers are
counterproductive. See Langevoort, supra note 7, at 812-13.
103. Bainbridge, supra note 14, at 32.
104. See Susan Block-Lieb, The Logic and Limits of Contract Bankruptcy,
2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 503, 519-20 (2001) (arguing that bankruptcy rules should
maximize collective welfare, not just the welfare of creditors because the
debtor's financial distress affects creditors, shareholders, employees, and society
overall).
105. See Donald R. Korobkin, Rehabilitating Values: A Jurisprudence of
Bankruptcy, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 717, 732-39 (1991) (analyzing the distinction
between bankruptcy law and other creditor remedies under non-bankruptcy law
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purposes of business bankruptcies also should consider the interests
of employees, trade suppliers, and the community surrounding the
debtor. 106 As the Enron and WorldCom bankruptcies demonstrate,
corporate defaults have a dramatic impact on employees, the
debtor's business associates, and the local community. 107 Thus,
whether Chapter 11 normatively should protect the interests of
anyone other than creditors, as a descriptive matter it is clear that
business bankruptcies affect suppliers, taxing authorities, and
others in the debtor's community. Having a clear duty avoids the
uncertainties (and potential breach of duty litigation) resulting from
the conflicting interests directors currently have because the duty
will allow them to consider the firm's overall community of interests
once the firm becomes insolvent. 108
3. The Duty to Timely File Will Lead to More Efficient Filings
Finally, imposing a duty to timely place firms under the

while accepting that the basic purpose of bankruptcy law is to re-allocate funds
among creditors); Robert E. Scott, Through Bankruptcy with the Creditors'
Bargain Heuristic, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 690, 700-08 (1986) (book review)
(comparing the risk-sharing aspects of bankruptcy law and its affects on
creditors to that of a captain's decision while in command of a sinking ship).
106. Edward S. Adams, Governance in Chapter 11 Reorganizations:
Reducing Costs, Improving Results, 73 B.U. L. REV. 581, 629-30 (1993)
(discussing goals Congress intended to foster when it enacted Chapter 11,
including protecting the investing public, protecting jobs, furthering overriding
community goals and values); Symposium, What Constitutes Success in Chapter
11?: A Roundtable Discussion, 2 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 229, 233-37 (1994)
(recognizing community impact as a Chapter 11 concern, but re-asserting that
paying creditors is the main goal); Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence
Westbrook, Financial Characteristics of Businesses in Bankruptcy, 73 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 499, 553 (1999) (noting Congress' keen awareness of how
bankruptcy law may affect jobs and local communities).
107. Filings for public companies are at especially high levels. In addition to
the Enron and WorldCom filings, other recent large corporate filings include
Kmart, USAirways, United Airlines, and Global Crossing. In 2001, 257 publicly
traded companies (with $256 billion in assets) filed for bankruptcy, a forty-six
percent increase in filings, the highest recorded since 1980, and more than
double the annual filings in the last recession (ninety-one in 1992, and 125 in
1991). Carter Pate, The Phoenix Forecast: Bankruptcies and Restructurings
2002, 2-3 (Mar. 2002), at http://www.abiworld.org/researchlpwcreport.pdf.
Recent empirical data suggest that potentially two million new employees
annually may be employed by firms who file for bankruptcy. Warren &
Westbrook, supra note 106, at 554.
108. As one commentator has stated in discussing constituency statutes, in
many instances directors seem to be "blindly groping to balance the conflicting
interests" of shareholders and creditors with little guidance to determine how to
respond to the duties they may have to those constituent groups. See Mitchell,
supra note 46, at 589.
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protection of bankruptcy laws should result in earlier, more efficient
Chapter 7 liquidations, Chapter 11 reorganizations, or Chapter 11
109
liquidations.
In general, Chapter 11 reorganizations are favored
over liquidations because they give managers the possibility (even if
remote) of restructuring the firm's finances or operations, thereby
protecting employee jobs, paying creditors and producing a return
110
for shareholders. Whether because oflocal culture, 111 or a desire to
take advantage of the delay allowed by a Chapter 11 filing, the vast
majority oflarge firms (i.e. those with assets of$500,000) file first in
Chapter 11 even if they have no realistic possibility of
reorganizing. 112 Thus, Chapter 11 appears to have assumed the role
of the chapter of choice for large businesses who intend to either
reorganize or liquidate. 113 Even if firms that ultimately liquidate file
109. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 233-34 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5963, 6193 ("One of the problems that the Bankruptcy Commission recognized
in current bankruptcy and reorganization practice is that debtors too often wait
too long to seek bankruptcy relief."). The Code allows firms to liquidate in
either Chapter 7 or 11. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(4) (1994). As an initial matter,
encouraging earlier filings was one of the goals of Chapter 11. See H.R. REP.
No. 95-595, at 220:
The purpose of a business reorganization case, unlike a liquidation
case, is to restructure a business's finances so that it may continue to
operate, provide its employees with jobs, pay its creditors, and
produce a return for its stockholders. The premise of a business
reorganization is that assets that are used for production in the
industry for which they were designed are more valuable than those
same assets sold for scrap.
110. See Adams, supra note 106, at 610 (theorizing that most debtors in
possession will favor Chapter 11 reorganization over Chapter 7 liquidation
because "Chapter 11 provide[s] a corporate debtor with considerable latitude
regarding its creditors," and "offers managers an opportunity to retain their
jobs and orchestrate the reorganization"); Warren & Westbrook, supra note 106,
at 501 (proposing that since "liquidation bankruptcy terminates the business,
few businesses will file for Chapter 7 unless they have no hope of survival").
111. See Jean Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy: One Code,
Many Cultures, 67 AM. BANKR. L.J. 501, 503 (1993) (suggesting "that local
administrative practices and legal culture have more effect on choices in
consumer bankruptcy than do features of the law").
112. Warren & Westbrook, supra note 106, at 523.
113. For example, Montgomery Ward's first Chapter 11 petition was filed in
1997. Ultimately, it filed a Chapter 11liquidation in 2000. Leslie Kaufman &
Claudia H. Deutsch, Montgomery Ward to Close Its Doors, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29,
2000, at Cl. Similarly, Service Merchandise operated under Chapter 11
bankruptcy protection since 1999. By 2002, however, the company decided to
cease all business operations. Service Merchandise, A Retailer, To Close, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 5, 2002, at C4; see also Lynn M. Lopucki & William C. Whitford,
Patterns in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies,
78 CORNELL L. REv. 597, 601 (1993) [hereinafter Lopucki & Whitford, Patterns]
(indicating that twelve percent of confirmed Chapter 11 plans are liquidations);
Robert K. Rasmussen, The Efficiency of Chapter 11, 8 BANKR. DEV. J. 319, 322
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initially in Chapter 11, an earlier filing should better preserve the
value of the finn and allow it either to be a more successful
reorganization (which will benefit employees, trade creditors,
suppliers, and the local community) or a more efficient liquidation
that provides a higher return for creditors.
While earlier filings ultimately should benefit the finn and its
community of interests, a duty to timely file is neither risk-free nor
cost-free.
Bankruptcy proceedings-especially Chapter 11
reorganizations-are routinely criticized for being inefficient, for
benefiting only bankruptcy professionals and for having excessive
indirect and direct costs. 114 Imposing a duty to timely file arguably
will cause directors to become overly risk averse and lead them to
place solvent firms in bankruptcy. As an initial matter, it is worth
noting that it is highly unlikely that a duty to timely file would
cause a rational director of a completely solvent firm to place the
firm in bankruptcy as business bankruptcy filings-especially for
public companies-are rare. 115
Business filings remain an
insignificant percentage of total filings notwithstanding the recent
increase in corporate defaults. 116 Given the low filing rate, it
(1991) (indicating that twenty to thirty percent of confirmed Chapter 11 plans
are liquidation reorganizations).
114. See THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPI'CY LAW 2027 (1986); Douglas G. Baird, A World Without Bankruptcy, 50 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 173, 185 (1987); Rasmussen, supra note 113, at 323 (discussing the
efficiency of bankruptcy law and noting the "robust" academic debate on
whether efficiency, rather than redistribution of wealth, should be the main
goal of bankruptcy); Scott, supra note 105, at 700-07 (concluding that
bankruptcy is animated by a "conflict between the maximization of insolvent
debtors' assets and distributional equality among claimants").
115. REPORT, supra note 1, at 303 (business bankruptcy filings represent
only four percent of overall filings). Since 1983, the annual filing rates for
public companies have ranged from 1.34% to 0.54%. Lynn M. LoPucki & Sara
D. Kalin, The Failure of Public Company Bankruptcies in Delaware and New
York: Empirical Evidence of a "Race to the Bottom," 54 VAND. L. REV. 231, 242
(2001). Though bankruptcy filings for public companies have been the subject
of much academic commentary, small business filings (not those of publicly-held
companies) dominate Chapter 11. See Warren & Westbrook, supra note 106, at
520, 550 (indicating that more than half of the business filers schedule less than
$100,000 in assets and only fifteen percent have more than $500,000 in total
assets as of filing and indicating that publicly traded cases were less than
0.006% of all business filings).
116. For example, despite the recent increase in business filings, business
filings in both 2001 and 2002 were less than three percent of total bankruptcy
filings. Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Record Breaking Bankruptcy Filings
Reported in Calendar Year 2001 (Feb. 19, 2002), at http://www.uscourts.gov/
Press_Releases/cy01bk.pdf; Am. Bankr. Inst., U.S. Bankruptcy Filing Statistics,
at http://www.abiworld.org/stats/currentstats.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2002);
Am. Bankr. Inst., U.S. Bankruptcy Filings 1980-2002 (Business, Non-Business,
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appears that even firms that face temporary financial setbacks can
often be saved without the need to file for bankruptcy. 117
Even a slight increase in bankruptcy filings likely would be
unacceptable to critics who contend that business reorganizations
under Chapter 11 are "unsuccessful,"118 are substantially more
expensive than market driven methods to resolve a firm's insolvency
and fail to maximize the wealth or protect the owners' (i.e., the
firm's creditors) state law entitlements to be paid pursuant to the

Total), at http://www.abiworld.org/stats/1980annual.html (last visited Feb. 28,
2003).
117. See Tabas v. Greenleaf Ventures, Inc. (In re Flagship Healthcare, Inc.),
269 B.R. 721, 728 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2001) ("In the world of corporate workouts,
turnaround managers and the possibility for a quick change in an economic
tide, it is not uncommon for a corporation to revitalize itself and work out
financial problems no matter how dire they appear.").
118. There is no clear definition of a "successful" Chapter 11 case. Some
commentators define success as a confirmed reorganization plan, while others
view the case as successful only if the firm either does not file a subsequent
Chapter 11 petition or does not ultimately liquidate (either within or outside
bankruptcy). See Lopucki & Whitford, Patterns, supra note 113, at 599-600
(chronicling lawyer and commentator definitions of "success"); see also Lynn M.
Lopucki, The Debtor in Full Control-Systems Failure Under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code? (First Installment), 57 AM. BANKR. L.J. 99, 100 (1983)
(indicating success rate of twenty-six percent); Rasmussen, supra note 113, at
322 (indicating confirmation rate of seventeen to thirty percent); REPORT, supra
note 1, at 308 (noting general lack of data, but citing statistics that suggest that
Chapter 11 plans are confirmed in less than a third of all cases); What
Constitutes Success in Chapter 11? A Roundtable Discussion, supra note 106, at
240-45 (discussing different views of what may constitute a Chapter 11
success). While smaller businesses confirm bankruptcy plans in less than thirty
percent of all cases, the success rate for large, publicly-traded firms is estimated
to be much higher. See Edward I. Altman, Evaluating the Chapter 11
Bankruptcy-Reorganization Process, 1993 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 1, 5 (1993)
(estimating that almost forty-eight percent of publicly-owned companies had a
plan confirmed); LoPucki & Whitford, Patterns, supra note 113, at 600-01
(citing studies that show that the Chapter 11 plan confirmation rate is low
because most Chapter 11 cases involve smaller companies); Elizabeth Warren,
The Untenable Case for Repeal of Chapter 11, 102 YALE L.J. 437, 443 (1992)
(suggesting that ninety percent of large, publicly-traded firms confirm a plan).
Recent empirical evidence suggests that Chapter 11 filings in Delaware
are less "successful" than filings in other states as evidenced by the purportedly
higher refiling rates for companies who filed there. See LoPucki & Kalin, supra
note 115, at 254-60 (analyzing why Delaware refiling rates are higher than
optimal). But see Robert Rasmussen & Randall S. Thomas, Whither the Race?
A Comment on the Effects of the Delawarization of Corporate Reorganizations,
54 VAND. L. REV. 283, 285-86 (2001) (arguing against Lopucki and Kalin's
assessment of Delaware's failure rate for Chapter 11 based on refilings because
there may be "an optimal, non-zero amount of refilings").
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terms of the firm's contracts with them. 119 Part of the controversy
concerning the inefficiency of Chapter 11 reorganizations is the
relatively high failure rate. Empirical data suggest, however, that
many Chapter 11 reorganizations (and out-of-court workouts) are
unsuccessful because firms enter bankruptcy reorganizations too
highly leveraged and, in many instances, fail to sufficiently reduce
debt in the reorganization. 120 While imposing the duty to file may
cause some directors to prematurely file bankruptcy petitions for
financially distressed (yet not insolvent) firms, firms that are not
over-leveraged or otherwise hopelessly insolvent have a better
chance of emerging from a Chapter 11 reorganization with fewer
debts and paying a greater percentage of creditors claims in either a
bankruptcy liquidation or reorganization.
119. Some critics suggest that, rather than reorgamzmg firms under
Chapter 11, a firm's assets should be auctioned as a going concern shortly after
the bankruptcy filing. See Douglas G. Baird, Revisiting Auctions in Chapter 11,
36 J.L. & ECON. 633, 647 (1993) (arguing that an immediate auction should be
as beneficial as a long search for different buyers of assets); Douglas G. Baird,
The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 127, 128
(1986) (theorizing that reorganization will rarely be more optimal than
liquidation); Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Debt: A New Model for Corporate
Reorganization, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 531 (1983) (suggesting that marketbased mechanisms are a possibility for cheaper and quicker reorganizations).
Others argue that Chapter 11 should be replaced with a system that removes
existing shareholders upon default and gives creditors the option to purchase
shares of the reorganized debtor. See Barry E. Adler, Financial and Political
Theories of American Corporate Bankruptcy, 45 STAN. L. REV. 311, 319 (1993)
(offering proposed market remedies to bankruptcy that give creditors priority
thereby eliminating prolonged negotiation and litigation expenses); Lucian Arye
Bebchuk, A New Approach to Corporate Reorganizations, 101 HARv. L. REV.
775, 785-86 (1988) (devising a model that divides interests between levels of
creditors). Finally, some propose that debtors be allowed to waive their right to
file for bankruptcy, or that Chapter 11 be abolished in favor of allowing
creditors to exercise their state law collection remedies. See James W. Bowers,
Whither What Hits the Fan?: Murphy's Law, Bankruptcy Theory, and the
Elementary Economics of Loss Distribution, 26 GA. L. REV. 27, 69 (1991)
(asserting that debtors may be just as efficient liquidators and distributors
under non-bankruptcy creditor remedies in the absence of bankruptcy law);
Robert K. Rasmussen, Debtor's Choice: A Menu Approach to Corporate
Bankruptcy, 71 TEX. L. REV. 51, 99 (1992) (proposing that allowing state law to
handle resource allocation and the elimination of federal bankruptcy law would
increase efficiency); Alan Schwartz, Bankruptcy Workouts and Debt Contracts,
36 J.L. & ECON. 595, 599 (1993) (arguing that parties should be able to waive
bankruptcy process in favor of debt contracts).
120. See LoPucki & Kalin, supra note 115, at 262, 265 (theorizing that
Delaware's bankruptcy courts' approach may not sufficiently induce firms to
reduce their leverage ratios); Rasmussen & Thomas, supra note 118, at 300
(suggesting that insufficient debt reduction will fail to alleviate financial
distress).
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Moreover, it is simply unrealistic to assume that imposing a
duty to timely file (even if the duty increases the overall number of
filings) will dramatically increase insolvency costs. Though there
are direce21 and indirect costs 122 associated with bankruptcy
proceedings, firms who experience financial distress will incur many
of these costs even if they do not file for bankruptcy. Once a firm
experiences financial distress, its creditors will increase their
monitoring costs and the firm will incur costs to negotiate (or
renegotiate) its debts with those creditors. 123 Likewise, financially
distressed firms who may be forced to incur costs to participate in
out-of-court restructurings, may need to eliminate or curtail
business operations, and the firm may be harmed if their credit
ratings are lowered once they default on debt repayment. 124 Indeed,
even if Chapter 11 is unsuccessful (however defined), empirical data
indicate that out-of-court restructurings may be even more
expensive than a bankruptcy filing, may have even higher failure
121. Direct costs are the transaction costs of the bankruptcy case, primarily
lawyer, accountant, and other professional fees. Adams, supra note 106, at 607.
Direct costs appear to be considerably less than earlier suspected. See Stephen
J. Lubben, The Direct Costs of Corporate Reorganization: An Empirical
Examination of Professional Fees in Large Chapter 11 Cases, 74 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 509, 515 (2000) (concluding that direct costs in large reorganizations are
approximately two percent of firm assets); Lawrence A. Weiss, Bankruptcy
Resolution: Direct Costs and Violation of Priority of Claims, 27 J. FIN. ECON.
285, 286 (1990) (placing costs at three percent of assets).
122. See Adams, supra note 106, at 608. Estimates of these direct and
indirect costs vary widely. See Edward I. Altman, A Further Empirical
Investigation of the Bankruptcy Cost Question, 39 J. FIN. 1067, 1077-78 (1984);
James S. Ang et al., The Administrative Costs of Corporate Bankruptcy: A Note,
37 J. FIN. 219, 224-25 (1982); Sanjai Bhagat et al., The Costs of Inefficient
Bargaining and Financial Distress: Evidence from Corporate Lawsuits, 35 J.
FIN. ECON. 221, 242 (1994); David M. Cutler & Lawrence H. Summers, The
Costs of Conflict Resolution and Financial Distress: Evidence from the TexacoPennzoil Litigation, 19 RAND J. EcoN. 157, 167-68 (1988) (theorizing that
indirect costs were responsible for Texaco's decline in value); Stuart C. Gilson et
al., Troubled Debt Restructurings: An Empirical Study of Private
Reorganization of Firms in Default, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 315, 335-38 (1990); Jerold
B. Warner, Bankruptcy Costs: Some Evidence, 32 J. FIN. 337, 338 (1977); Weiss,
supra note 121, at 289; Michelle J. White, Bankruptcy Costs and the New
Bankruptcy Code, 38 J. FIN. 477,483-84 (1983).
123. Block-Lieb, supra note 104, at 556-57 (arguing that eliminating the
bankruptcy system will not eliminate all enforcement costs); Rasmussen &
Thomas, supra note 118, at 294 (characterizing financial distress as "costly" and
describing a financially distressed firm's indirect costs outside of bankruptcy).
124. In general, a credit rating reflects the rating company's opinion of a
firm's capacity to pay its commitments on a timely basis. See Leo Brand,
Corporate Defaults: Will Things Get Worse Before They Get Better, STANDARD &
POOR'S CREDITWEEK, Jan. 31, 2001, at 16, 16.
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rates, and, moreover, are often followed by a Chapter 7 filing. 125
A duty to timely file should respond to one of the biggest
criticisms of Chapter 11, i.e., the improper role managers play before
and during the firm's bankruptcy. Some commentators argue that
the debtor-in-possession model adopted by Chapter 11 is flawed
because director-managers almost always retain control over the
debtor and will strategically prolong the lives of hopelessly insolvent
firms simply to extend their tenure as executives. 126 These critics
maintain that Chapter 11 is viewed as a ''way-station in a journey
toward liquidation" 127 and that managers seek relief in a
reorganization proceeding (or in serial proceedings) 128 simply to
preserve their jobs. 129 To Chapter 11 critics, neither shareholders,
creditors, nor employees benefit from Chapter 11 reorganizations;
125. See generally Stuart C. Gilson, Transactions Costs and Capital
Structure Choice: Evidence from Financially Distressed Firms, 52 J. FIN. 161
(1997) (examining the transaction costs of out-of-court workouts); Gilson et al.,
supra note 122 (examining the success rates of out-of-court restructurings).
126. Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for
Chapter 11, 101 YALE L.J. 1043, 1044-45 (1992).
127. Baird & Jackson, supra note 68, at 126.
128. There have been a number of highly-publicized serial business
bankruptcy filings. For example, TWA filed its first bankruptcy petition in
1992, its second in 1995, and its third in January 2001. Cynthia Wilson, The
History of TWA, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 2, 2001, at A10. The third filing
was used to consummate a sale of the firm to American Airlines. I d. Similarly,
Phar-Mor, Inc., filed for Chapter 11 protection in 1992 after allegations that its
senior managers embezzled funds from the corporation then overstated
earnings. Don Shilling, Corporate Scandal, Rise of Larger Chains Doom OncePromising Phar-Mor, VINDICATOR (Youngstown, OH), Jul. 19, 2002. Though it
emerged from Chapter 11 in 1995, it filed again in September 2001 and will be
liquidated. See Phar-Mor, Drugstore Chain, Files for Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 25, 2001, at C2; Shilling, supra (discussing sale of company's assets); see
also Altman, supra note 122, at 6 (commenting that a "non-trivial" number of
emerged Chapter 11's refile); Edith Shwalb Hotchkiss, Postbankruptcy
Performance and Management Turnover, 50 J. FIN. 3, 4, 7 (1995) ("Thirty-two
percent of the sample firms are involved in a second bankruptcy or distressed
restructuring."); LoPucki & Kalin, supra note 115, at 235 n.16 (2001)
(commenting on the high rates of bankruptcy refilings); Lopucki & Whitford,
Patterns, supra note 113, at 609 (characterizing refiling rates as
"extraordinarily high"); James D. Key, Comment, The Advent of the Serial
Chapter 11 Filing and Its Implications, 8 BANKR. DEV. J. 245, 255-58 (1991)
(discussing serial Chapter 11 filings).
129. See, e.g., Baird & Jackson, supra note 68, at 126 (contending that delay
gives managers a strategic advantage over creditors). Likewise, critics contend
that bankruptcy laws give managers the incentive to transfer wealth from
creditors to equity holders and, by allowing the managers to remain in control
of the debtor, allow them to overstate expected net cash flows, understate risks,
and generally prevent creditors from being able to protect their interests during
the bankruptcy proceeding. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 126, at 1052-53.
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only corporate managers, lawyers, and bankruptcy consultants
benefit. 130
While managers may have a career interest in preserving the
firm, 131 empirical data indicate that, as a practical matter, Chapter
11 will not allow them to accomplish that. 132 Empirical data suggest
that in most instances key managers or directors are either replaced
or voluntarily leave within two years following the filing of a
Chapter 11 petition and often have gloomy prospects for future
employment in large firms in a managerial role. 133 Though the
recent practice adopted by some bankruptcy courts of allowing the
debtor to pay key employees pre-petition or post-petition "retention"
incentives or bonuses suggest that these managers are valuable to
the firm at least in the initial stages, 134 directors and managers most
130. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 126, at 1073.
131. LoPucki & Whitford, Corporate Governance, supra note 41, at 685
(recognizing that Chapter 11 reorganization may be the "only means of
salvaging" the careers and reputations of managers).
132. Id. at 723-24 (finding that there was a change in CEOs of large,
corporate debtors in ninety-one percent of the cases studied); LoPucki &
Whitford, Patterns, supra note 113, at 610 (discussing rapid turnover of
corporate managers in Chapter 11 reorganizations of publicly held companies);
Stuart C. Gilson, Bankruptcy, Boards, Banks and Blockholders: Evidence on
Changes in Corporate Ownership and Control When Firms Default, 27 J. FIN.
EcoN. 355 (1990) [hereinafter Gilson, Blockholders]; Stuart C. Gilson,
Management Turnover and Financial Distress, 25 J. FIN. ECON. 241 (1989)
[hereinafter Gilson, Management Turnover]; Warren, supra note 118, at 449
(finding that seventy-one percent of managers of firms filing for bankruptcy lost
their jobs).
133. LoPucki & Whitford, Corporate Governance, supra note 41, at 723-24;
LoPucki & Whitford, Patterns, supra note 113, at 610; Gilson, Blockholders,
supra note 132; Gilson, Management Turnover, supra note 132; Warren, supra
note 118, at 449.
134. Richard A. Oppel, Jr. & Kurt Eichenwald, Enron Paid $55 Million For
Bonuses, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2001, at Cl. The practice of paying huge sums to
key employees of debtor firms is not uncommon. Large business debtors argue
that they must give retention, or "pay to stay" bonuses to mission-critical
employees to prevent them from abandoning the firm during the thankless
phase of rebuilding or dismantling an ailing enterprise. See Bethlehem Asks to
Give $9 Million in Bonuses; Bankruptcy Judge Gets Plan, PLAIN DEALER
(Cleveland), Dec. 29, 2001, at C1 (discussing retention bonuses for Bethlehem
Steel Corp. and LTV Corp. executives); Nancy Rivera Brooks, Enron Execs Were
Paid to Remain, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2001, at B3 (contrasting average $110,000
retention bonus to average $4500 severance pay to lower level workers and
discussing retention bonuses for PG&E Corp.'s key managers); Ann Davis,
Want Some Extra Cash? File for Chapter 11, WALL ST. J., Oct. 31, 2001, at C1;
Enron Asks Court for Another Round of Retention Bonuses, WALL ST. J., Apr. 1,
2002, at C6 (reporting that Enron petitioned the court to approve a third round
of bonuses worth $130 million to key employees); Jeff St. Onge, Bankruptcy
Judge OKs WorldCom Bonuses; $25M Intended to Help Retain Key Staff, THE
RECORD (Bergen County, N.J.), Oct. 30, 2002, at B1 (reporting that a
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likely understand that they will be replaced if their firms are placed
in bankruptcy. Given this, they have every incentive to delay the
filing to preserve their jobs.
Creditors' interests during the bankruptcy case already have
some protection from managers' opportunistic behavior because the
bankruptcy court oversees many of the decisions managers make
during the firm's bankruptcy proceeding and creditors have the
right to curtail some of management's decision-making authority135
or to replace managers or require that they be supervised. 136 Even
bankruptcy judge approved twenty-five million dollars in retention bonuses for
WorldCom key executives over the objections of creditors); Nelson D. Schwartz
et al., Greed-Mart; Attention Kmart Investors. The Company May Be Bankrupt,
But Its Top Brass Have Been Raking It In, FORTUNE, Oct. 14, 2002, at 139, 139
(reporting Kmart's use of over two million dollars in "inducement payments"
and incentives to top executives); Speedo Maker Asks Bankruptcy Judge to
Approve Bonuses, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2001, at C6 (discussing retention bonuses
for key employees of Warnaco Group (the maker of Calvin Klein jeans and
Speedo swimwear)); Chris Woodyard & Martin Kasindorf, Enron Execs Pocket
Big Bonuses, USA TODAY, Feb. 1, 2002, at Bl.
Legislation recently was proposed to recover excessive funds paid to
officers and directors both before and after a bankruptcy filing. See Employee
Abuse Prevention Act of2002, H.R. 5221, 107th Cong. (2002).
135. For example, creditors who are unhappy with management's
governance decisions can move to dismiss the case or convert it to a Chapter 7
liquidation. 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b) (1994). In addition, debtors are required to
negotiate with the creditors' committee to get the plan confirmed and creditors
can move to terminate the debtor's exclusive right to propose a plan. Id.
§ 1102(a)(1) (requiring of creditor committee); id. § 1121(c) (granting creditors'
committee the right to terminate exclusivity). Though 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1)
requires that a creditors' committee be appointed, in practice they generally are
not appointed in small business filings. See, e.g., Frost, supra note 50, at 104,
113 (1998). Moreover, courts can use informal procedures like increased
monitoring, mediating, status conferences, expedited procedures and the threat
of reduced counsel fees to curtail managers' authority. See Ron. A. Thomas
Small, Small Business Bankruptcy Cases, 1 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 305, 307
(1993) (discussing fast track procedures used in the Eastern District of North
Carolina). These creditors' rights tend to have little value in smaller Chapter
11 cases where unsecured creditors tend not to participate because of the small
stakes involved.
136. In most Chapter 11 cases, a Trustee is not appointed and the debtor
continues to operate the firm as a debtor-in-possession ("DIP"). The DIP has
the same rights, powers, and duties given to a Trustee. 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a). It
is quite likely that the DIP in a Chapter 11 reorganization will be reluctant to
pursue claims against the directors, since the managers of a Chapter 11 debtor
almost always are the same managers who operated the firm pre-petition. In
cases where the DIP unjustifiably refuses to bring an avoidance action, the
unsecured creditors' committee can seek leave from the court to pursue the
claims on behalf of the DIP. See La. World Exposition v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Co.,
858 F.2d 233, 248 (5th Cir. 1988); see also In re Perkins, 902 F.2d 1254, 1258
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imposing a duty to timely file will not prevent managers from
continuing to retain some benefits from Chapter 11 filings.
Likewise, imposing the duty to timely file may not prevent directormanagers from using Chapter 11 to delay their inevitable
termination. However, requiring directors to file earlier ultimately
should cause creditors to receive a higher percentage of recovery on
their claims, should lead to more successful reorganizations, and
might even allow shareholders to retain some of their interests in
the reorganized business. 137 Managers will have less of an
opportunity to waste corporate assets pre-filing if directors ensure
that firms file for bankruptcy at an earlier date. Finally, it is worth
noting that even if(l) the duty to timely file increases the number of
corporate bankruptcy filings and (2) Chapter 11 is not perfect, as a
practical reality, it has proven to be better than the existing
alternatives. 138
Before discussing proposed elements for the duty to timely file,
the next section briefly addresses the likely criticisms of any
proposal to increase directors' liability.
B.

Potential Unintended Consequences of a Duty to Timely File

Imposing Liability May Have a Chilling Effect on Directors
The most compelling reason not to impose a duty to timely file is
the risk that the duty will cause directors to either refuse board
service or make them overly cautious. 139 Risk-averse actors would
1.

(7th Cir. 1990). Moreover, in particularly egregious cases, creditors who are
unhappy with management's governance decisions can move to have a Chapter
11 trustee appointed to replace managers or to have an examiner oversee
aspects of the case. 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a). Again, it is likely that these rights will
be exercised only in larger business filings.
137. Indeed, if the bankruptcy reorganization is a "success" and creditors are
generally happy with the performance of the firm's management team during
bankruptcy, current managers are more likely to be allowed to remain with the
firm.
138. See generally Lynn M. LoPucki, Strange Visions in a Strange World: A
Reply to Professors Bradley and Rosenzweig, 91 MICH. L. REV. 79, 107-09 (1992);
Warren, supra note 118, at 477-78. Indeed, one critic of Chapter 11 has
concluded that Chapter 11 must in fact be efficient, or else it would not have
survived. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Is Corporate Bankruptcy Efficient?, 27 J.
FIN. ECON. 411, 413 (1990).
139. During the height of the D&O insurance crisis in the mid-1980s,
several news reports indicated that directors resigned due to lack of insurance.
See 2 DENNIS J. BLOCK ET AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE FIDUCIARY DUTIES
OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS 2174 nn.1837-39 (1998). Unfortunately, limited
empirical data substantiates this. See generally Cohen, supra note 25, at 35253 (citing paper that suggests that directors in Australia make decisions in the
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rationally take excessive precautions and avoid risky decisions.
Similarly, though directors tend to be well-educated, if they are not
lawyers, they may overestimate the likelihood of their liability
exposure and may make conservative decisions to ensure they
comply with the legal rules. 140 Directors, who tend to hold
prominent positions with other companies, often respond to legal
interventions to avoid being subjected to prolonged litigation. 141
Thus, even if a director suspects that she would not be held liable for
violating a duty, she will act with caution to avoid the delays
associated with litigation and the exposure of potentially
embarrassing facts. Similar arguments concerning the potential of
skewing director decision-making were raised when it appeared that
states were poised to increase potential director liability for breach
of care lawsuits 142 and when the Securities and Exchange
Commission proposed additional disclosure requirements for audit
committees. 143
To be sure, firms need managers and directors who are willing
to take reasonable risks because risks are an essential condition for
promoting and advancing corporate profits. Moreover, a proposal
that imposed liability on all directors of all firms that file for
bankruptcy or that exposed directors (especially outside directors) to
unlimited or massive liability would most certainly cause some
qualified individuals to refuse to serve as directors of corporate
boards. 144 If, however, directors could predict ex ante the likely
shadow of their potential personal liability); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The
Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards of Review in Corporate Law,
62 FORDHAM L. REV. 437, 459-60 (1993) (arguing for courts to apply a lower
standard of review in liability cases to avoid over-deterring directors); Rao et
al., supra note 51, at 57-60 (suggesting that directors who believe "they will not
be liable for good faith mistakes in judgment will be significantly less riskaverse than those who fear they may be held accountable for taking a risk that
turns out badly," and citing survey that indicated that directors considered the
potential for liability when deciding whether to serve as directors); Shaffer,
supra note 51, at 555; Tamar Lewin, Director Insurance Drying Up, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 7, 1986, at D1 (citing a survey by a management research firm that
indicated an overwhelming number of chief executives stated they would
decrease the number of directorships they accepted because of the fear of
increased liability).
140. See Cohen, supra note 25, at 353; Rao et al., supra note 51, at 58-59.
141. See Langevoort, supra note 7, at 823.
142. See, e.g., Park McGinty, The Twilight of Fiduciary Duties: On the Need
for Shareholder Self-Help in an Age of Formalistic Proceduralism, 46 EMORY
L.J. 163, 173-77 (1997).
143. Gregory S. Rowland, Earnings Management, the SEC, and Corporate
Governance: Director Liability Arising from the Audit Committee Report, 102
COLUM. L. REV. 168, 202 n.144 (2002).
144. Corporations and their directors reacted so swiftly (and negatively) to
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amount of liability they face if they fail to protect the firm by timely
filing a bankruptcy petition, and if the duty included a modest safe
harbor provision to give the directors an additional period of time to
comply with the duty, no rational director should either refuse to
serve or provide overly cautious service.

2.
A Duty to Timely File Will Increase Director and Officer
Liability Insurance Costs
Exposing directors to greater liability may also have the
unintended result of increasing the firm's director and officer
liability insurance costs. D&O policies serve two primary functions.
First, directors are entitled to seek direct payment under the policy
("liability coverage") if the firm does not (or cannot) fully reimburse
or indemnifY them for litigation expenses relating to their duties as
directors of the firm. 145 D&O coverage also insures the firm for any
expenses it incurs if it has to indemnify directors for wrongful acts,
errors, omissions, or breaches of duty. 146 D&O policies can also
insure firms against claims against the firm that are not otherwise
covered ("entity coverage"). 147
D&O insurance policies are costly, increased in the mid-1980s
due to an overall increase in the number of bankruptcies, mergers,
acquisitions, hostile takeovers, and public offerings, and appear to
have skyrocketed as a result of the recent accounting scandals. 148
Though costly, firms treat D&O coverage as a cost of doing business
because they know they will lose qualified directors if they fail to

Smith because it imposed potentially unlimited liability. The actual personal
liability of the directors in that case purportedly was $23.5 million. ROBERT W.
HAMILTON, CORPORATIONS INCLUDING PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS
727 (4th ed. 1990).
145. Palmore, supra note 48, at 105-06. Firms may be prevented under
applicable state law from indemnifying directors who breach the duty of good
faith or loyalty. Id. at 106-07. If the firm is statutorily prevented from
indemnifying the director, the director would then seek reimbursement directly
from the insurer. Id. at 108-09.
146. See George Ong, Directors and Officers Insurance Proceeds in
Bankruptcy: The Impact on an Estate and its Claimants, 13 BANKR. DEV. J. 235,
239 (1996).
147. Alstrin v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 179 F. Supp. 2d 376, 396 (D. Del.
2002). The policy in this case was limited to claims filed against the firm for
violations of federal securities laws.
148. See Ong, supra note 148, at 235 n.3; Palmore, supra note 48, at 104
n.18; Roberta Romano, What Went Wrong with Directors' and Officers' Liability
Insurance?, 14 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 13-14 (1989); Christopher Oster, Directors'
Insurance Fees Get Fatter: Paying More for Less Coverage Occurs as Fewer
Insurers Retain Appetite for Liability Business, WALL ST. J., Jul. 12, 2002, at Cl.
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provide this coverage. 149 It is especially likely that outside directors
would resign if D&O insurance is not provided, since they are not
employed by the debtor firm and thus have less of an incentive to
give beneficial advice or assistance to the firm. 150 While D&O
premiums likely would increase if there is a duty to timely file, the
risk to insurers and costs to firms should be modest as long as the
duty is carefully defined and limited. That is, the risk to directors
(and, thus insurers) imposed by breaching the duty to timely file
should not significantly increase the firm's insurance costs as long
as directors (and, thus insurers) can reasonably anticipate both
when directors are likely to be fined and the amount of that fine.
In theory, the availability of insurance will remove any
incentive for directors to file earlier petitions. That is, if directors
understand that they face no true liability, they may be unwilling to
change their views. This is unlikely to occur for several reasons.
First, while it is reasonable to assume that directors who intend to
harm the firm will refuse to change their behavior even in the face
of an increased risk of liability, this assumption is not a reasonable
one for directors who fail to file timely petitions based on an
unrealistic (but good faith) belief in their ability to save a firm.
Moreover, directors are likely to attempt to comply with changes in
the law to avoid the risk of litigation~ven if they think that their
decisions are justified under existing law. 151 Thus, a director who is
attempting to act in the firm's best interest will seek the opinion of
external, independent experts if he knows that he faces enhanced
liability for failing to ensure the continued financial feasibility of a
firm. If the expert opines that the firm cannot be saved absent
drastic measures (including, perhaps, a bankruptcy filing), no
reasonable director will continue to adhere to his belief that he (and
the board) can save the firm. Finally, academic literature suggests
that changes in the law often lead to changes in norms. 152 Given
this, increasing directors' legal liability is likely to influence their
behavioral rules and standards (including whether to increase their
149. It appears that several corporations lost directors in the mid-1980s
when their D&O insurance lapsed. See Rao et al., supra note 51, at 58-59;
Laurie Baum, The Job Nobody Wants, Bus. WK., Sept. 8, 1986, at 56, 56-57;
Lewin, supra note 139, at Dl.
150. See Bienenstock, supra note 74, at 545 (suggesting that independent
directors are likely to resign if they are major shareholders and assume their
equity positions will be eliminated during the bankruptcy or if D&O insurance
lapses).
151. See Langevoort, supra note 7, at 823.
152. See generally Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of
Conscious Power: Law, Norms, and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA.
L. REV. 1619, 1641-53 (2001).
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reliance on outside insolvency opinions) because changing the law
governing directors' duties to a firm will affect the norm-based
corporate culture. 153
The next section of this Article presents a model for a duty to
timely file and explains why a carefully crafted duty like the one
represented in this model will not harm the firm and will, instead,
give directors an incentive to act in the firm's best interest.

C.

Elements of the Duty

1. Establishing Liability
To overcome behavioral tendencies that might cause directors to
delay placing the firm under the protection of federal bankruptcy
laws, the duty to timely file should require directors to file a
bankruptcy petition within thirty days after the time they knew or
reasonably should have known that the firm was insolvent.
Providing a thirty day safe harbor gives the directors time while the
firm is in (or approaching) the ''vicinity of insolvency'' and during a
short time period following insolvency to determine whether they
need to place the firm in bankruptcy (and avoid liability) or quickly
initiate a plan to turnaround the firm's financial crisis (thus,
avoiding the need to file for bankruptcy). 154 Liability should not be
based on the date of the actual knowledge of insolvency for two main
reasons. First, basing liability on actual knowledge will allow
directors to avoid learning that a firm is approaching insolvency.
Moreover, if most directors fail to file timely petitions because of the
behavioral tendency to be overoptimistic, liability based on actual
knowledge will not force directors to seek outside advice to
determine whether the firm can be saved outside of bankruptcy.
Insolvency should have a fairly precise definition so directors
will know ex ante when they potentially face liability. Thus,
insolvency should be defined as the time when directors knew or
should have known that the firm would be unable to pay its
153. Id.
154. In addition, creating a safe harbor should decrease the number of
preferential transfers made before and during the ninety day window.
Currently, directors have an incentive to delay a bankruptcy filing if they know
that they made preferential or fraudulent transfers to themselves or favored
creditors. While the Trustee or DIP can recover some preferential transfers, the
recovery period is limited to either ninety days before the filing (for transfers to
non-insider creditors), or one year (for insider creditors). 11 U.S.C. § 54 7
(1994). Directors who suspect their firms are in the vicinity of insolvency have
an incentive to delay filing the petition to make sure the ninety day preference
window "closes," thus preventing the Trustee/DIP from recovering the transfer
from a favored creditor.
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probable liabilities on its existing debts when they mature, or
directors knew (or should have known) that the firm's liabilities
exceed the fair market value of the firm's current tangible assets. 155
To avoid such characterizations of insolvency, when evaluating
whether directors have failed to file timely, intangible property
should not be included as an asset and courts should be allowed to
consider evidence other than that listed on the debtor's schedules.
These objective insolvency tests (unlike the indeterminate ''vicinity
of insolvency'' test) give greater predictability to directors because
they give directors a readily ascertainable point to determine when
their fiduciary ·duties shift from one firm constituent (i.e.,
shareholders) to the firm's community of interests.
Though some commentators have suggested that there is no
objective criteria to determine insolvency156 and it may not be
possible to determine insolvency with mathematical precision in all
cases, it is simply unrealistic to assume that the firm's managers
consistently will be able to successfully mislead directors who are
attempting to be informed about the firm's finances. That is, just as
the Enron board sought advice when asked to consider the proposal
to use partnerships to hide Enron debt, 157 it is likely that directors

155. Debtors may not accurately state assets and debts on their bankruptcy
schedules (as evidenced by the Enron schedules that indicate that company was
balance sheet solvent). See Internet Bankruptcy Library (July 22, 2002), at
http://www.bankrupt.com/enron.txt.
Likewise, WorldCom's bankruptcy
schedules listed $103 billion in assets and forty-three billion dollars in debt,
though more than fifty billion dollars of the assets were intangible. See
Internet Bankruptcy Library (July 22, 2002), at http://www.bankrupt.com/
WorldCom.txt. Indeed, the Business Bankruptcy Project, a recent large-scale
study of all types of business bankruptcies, indicates that twenty-five percent of
business debtors claim to be balance sheet solvent and, among businesses in
Chapter 11 and 13, the proportion rises to more than one in three. Warren &
Westbrook, supra note 106, at 536-37. Fifty-five percent of the Chapter 11
cases with assets over $500,000 claimed to be solvent, versus twenty-one
percent of those with assets of less than $500,000. Id. at 540. The data does
not indicate whether businesses inflated the value of their assets to reassure
creditors (and thus were actually balance sheet insolvent) or whether the
businesses were equitably insolvent even if not balance sheet insolvent. Id. at
539.
156. See, e.g., Stephen R. McDonnell, Greyer v. Ingersoll Publications Co.:
Insolvency Shifts Directors' Burden From Shareholders to Creditors, 19 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 177, 206 (1994); Barbara Franklin, Directors' Duties: Insolvency Shifts
Burden From Shareholder to Creditor, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 6, 1992, at 5, 5
(suggesting that determining when a firm is insolvent is a tough task that
requires expensive expert opinions).
157. Enron's board appeared to have received detailed briefings about the
purpose and structure of the Fastow partnerships and the Securities and
Exchange Commission's concerns about the quality of Enron's financial
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will be told (or will discover) that the firm has (or soon will have)
financial obligations that could render it insolvent. 158 If the board
knows that the firm is experiencing financial difficulties and is
asked to permit the firm to engage in a questionable (though
arguably legal) financial transaction to preserve the appearance of
the firm's solvency/59 the board should at least know that the firm is
in the vicinity of insolvency. If the board chooses to approve of a
questionable financial practice, it would do so knowing that it faces
liability if the firm is currently insolvent and the maneuver fails to
prevent the firm from filing for bankruptcy. 160 Finally, it is
unrealistic to suggest that directors are incapable of determining
statements at least two years before the bankruptcy filing. See Abelson,
Enron's Board, supra note 100, at C6. In addition, Enron's law firm, Vinson &
Elkins, stated that Enron's accounting practices (though-they opined-not
illegal) could embarrass the company and cause litigation. Peter Behr & April
Witt, Concerns Grow Amid Conflicts; Officials Seek to Limit Probe, Fallout of
Deals, WASH. POST, July 30, 2002, at Al. The law firm's advice raises questions
of conflicts of interest, too. Because the firm had advised Enron about the use
of the partnerships in the late 1990s, it arguably should not have given Enron
advice about the continued legality of those partnerships. I d.
158. As a practical matter, firms either intentionally or unintentionally
signal when they are in financial distress. Typical signals that a firm is
experiencing financial distress are the refusal of creditors to extend credit on
favorable (or any) terms; the departure of key employees; an erosion of the
firm's goods/services; a decrease in inventory or a delay in the firm's ability to
place orders; a delay in the release of financial statements; or, at the latter
stages, a rating agency downgrade or the issuance of an auditor's going concern
or qualified opinion letter. When directors see those "red flags," they should be
on notice that the firm is either in the vicinity of insolvency or is insolvent.
159. This is exactly what Enron did when it asked its directors to approve
the Fastow partnerships. Despite what appeared to be a direct conflict of
interest, the board waived Enron's conflict-of-interest rules in June and October
of 1999 to permit Fastow to oversee the partnerships while remaining Enron's
CFO. Abelson, Enron's Collapse, supra note 81, at C1; see Kathleen Day &
Peter Behr, Enron Directors Backed Moving Debt Off Books, WASH. POST, Jan.
31, 2002, at Al.
This waiver ultimately permitted Fastow to earn
approximately thirty million dollars running the partnerships and hold a
controlling interest in most of them. Day & Behr, supra, at Al. Of course,
individual Enron directors had their own conflicts, as many of them earned
huge consulting fees from Enron, worked for non-profits that were funded by
Enron, were members of the boards of firms who were major Enron
shareholders, or worked for companies that had significant business
transactions with Enron. See, e.g., Christopher H. Schmitt, One Cozy Bunch: As
Enron Fell, Even Its Outside Board Members Had Become Insiders, U.S. NEWS
& WORLD REP., Feb. 11, 2002, at 28, 28; Yes Men, supra note 80, at A16
(reporting that one director earned almost $500,000 in consulting fees).
160. To encourage directors to carefully monitor the firm's solvency, they
should not be entitled to rely on the business judgment rule and instead should
be subject to liability for simple negligence.
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whether a firm is insolvent, since they already have a duty to cease
distributions to stockholders if doing so would render the firm
insolvent or leave it with insufficient working capital. 161
This duty arguably forces directors to consider a bankruptcy
filing even before the firm is in the ''vicinity of insolvency." If
directors are required to file a petition within thirty days of
insolvency, they necessarily will need to seek outside insolvency
advice (or themselves conduct an additional internal insolvency
analysis) at a much earlier period. Though directors would have a
relatively short time period in which to decide whether to place the
firm under bankruptcy protection, bankruptcy laws already deem
the firm's insiders to have knowledge of the firm's potential
insolvency up to a year before the filing. 162 Moreover, because it is
likely that a firm that is approaching insolvency will be in default on
its credit obligations and will otherwise signal that it is facing a
financial crisis, the thirty days is not unreasonable. Thus, unless
the firm suffered an unexpected financial setback, directors will
have known for considerably more than thirty days that a firm is
having a financial crisis and that drastic steps might need to be
taken to save the firm. Finally, there are benefits to having
directors file after the firm has encountered a financial crisis-but
before the firm is actually insolvent-since earlier filings increase
the possibility that shareholders' interest in the firm will be at least
partially preserved. 163

161. REVISED MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT§ 8.33 (1985).
162. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(B) (1994) allows the bankruptcy trustee to avoid
preferential payments made up to one year before the filing of the bankruptcy
petition if the transfer is to an insider. In contrast, transfers to non-insiders
can be avoided only if they are made within ninety days of the bankruptcy
filing. Id. § 547(b)(4)(A).
The directors of Enron knew that using the Fastow partnerships to hide
Enron's debts allowed Enron to significantly overstate earnings for several
years. They also knew several months before the filing that allowing Enron's
CFO to oversee the partnerships was at best questionable, as they ultimately
suspended Enron's conflict of interest rules to allow him to remain in this dual
capacity. Moreover, the Enron directors-especially the insiders-engaged in
numerous acts (selling stock, exercising stock options, paying themselves
retention bonuses) well before the filing that personally benefited themselves,
but harmed employees and general creditors. See Oppel & Eichenwald, supra
note 134, at C1 (reporting that days before bankruptcy filing, Enron paid 500
key employees $55 million in "retention incentives").
163. See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Control Rights, Priority
Rights, and the Conceptual Foundations of Corporate Reorganizations, 87 VA. L.
REV. 921, 952-54 (2001) (questioning the appropriate time for wiping out the
equity interest of shareholders).
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2. Establishing the Arrwunt of Liability
The fine imposed for breaching the duty to timely file should be
an amount equal to three times the highest directors' fee paid, or the
value of the property given in lieu of a fee, in the three years before
the filing. 164 Tying the sanction to the directors' fee in effect requires
directors to reimburse the firm for their failure to act in the best
interest of the firm by filing a timely bankruptcy petition. The fine
should be based on a three-year period to prevent directors from
strategically causing themselves to receive relatively small
compensation in the filing year. 165 Trebling is needed to ensure that
· the sanction is high enough to cause directors to overcome their
natural tendencies to avoid admitting that the firm cannot be
salvaged. Trebling also serves as a liability cap which allows
directors (and potentially the firm's insurer) to calculate ex ante the
extent of potential liability if they choose not to place an insolvent
firm under the protection of federal bankruptcy laws.
Though directors of larger firms often receive sizeable director's
fees, 166 most outside directors tend to be highly compensated officers
of other corporations and thus serve on boards for non-financial
reasons, including prestige and the contacts they make with other
outside directors. 167 Proposing a significantly higher fee or one that
does not relate to money or property the directors received from the
firm would be unwise because that likely would overdeter and

164. This Article does not specifically consider the amount of damages that
should be assessed against directors of firms that do not pay fees. These
directors also should face a sanction to avoid having firms pay their directors in
forms other than cash to avoid liability for breaching the duty to timely file. If
firms choose to pay their directors in stock or stock options, the fine should be
three times the value of the stock when the directors either sell it or when they
have the first opportunity to sell it. If directors receive no form of compensation
for serving as directors, the fine could be based on other objective criteria such
as, for example, some percentage of the difference between the unexplained and
unaccounted for discrepancies between the assets listed in the bankruptcy
schedules and those listed on the firm's most recent financial statement
prepared for an outside lender.
165. In addition, directors should be subject to the fine even if they waive
their right to receive a director's fee.
166. Enron directors were paid in excess of $300,000-$400,000 in cash and
stock in 2001. Yes Men, supra note 80, at A16; see Abelson, Enron's Collapse,
supra note 81, at Cl. Other firms had similar (sometimes significantly higher)
compensation plans for their directors. See Gary Strauss, Corporate Perks Add
Zing to Juicy Jobs on Boards Free Products, Services Help Sweeten the Pot, USA
TODAY, Apr. 17, 2000, at B3 (reporting $645,700 annual fee to Microsoft
directors, $386,320 to Dell directors, and $341,900 to Goldman Sachs directors).
167. See Eisenberg, supra note 25, at 970-71 (discussing the nonfinancial
benefits outside directors receive in addition to the directors' fee).
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discourage too many qualified and competent directors from serving
on corporate boards. Because so few firms actually file bankruptcy
petitions, and the proposed duty to timely file gives directors a
thirty-day safe harbor, this sanction should not cause rational
directors to refuse to serve or make overly cautious decisions.
Since this proposal would be imposed only if the firm is placed
under the protection of federal bankruptcy laws, directors of firms
that are liquidated outside of bankruptcy (for example, in a state
receivership) would not face treble damages. Adopting such a model
arguably could lead to unwanted forum shopping. In general,
directors' obligations to firms should not turn on whether the
insolvent firm files a bankruptcy petition or dissolves under state
law. 168 While it is possible that the prospect of a fine in bankruptcy
might cause some directors to allow their firms to be liquidated
outside of bankruptcy, this result is unlikely for several reasons.
While directors generally control whether the firm files for
bankruptcy, and most Chapter 11 filings are voluntary petitions, as
one noted academic commentator has observed: bankruptcy filings
are rarely truly voluntary. 169 Instead, firms most often are placed in
bankruptcy typically after an institutional lender with a security
interest in all the firm's assets threatens to exercise its state law
remedies to seize them, the IRS threatens to levy on a firm's assets,
or an unsecured creditor attempts to obtain a security interest in the
debtor's assets. 170 Moreover, creditors always have the right to file
an involuntary bankruptcy petition if the firm appears insolvent and
is not paying its debts when due. 171 Finally, while directors have
somewhat ambiguous fiduciary duties to creditors when the firm
becomes insolvent, directors who intentionally let a firm
deteriorate-rather than declare bankruptcy for the firm-to avoid
being fined for failing to file timely most likely would be deemed to
have violated both the duty of care and duty of loyalty they owe
shareholders and the fiduciary duties (however defined) they owe
creditors. 172
168. See Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping, and
Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 815, 822 (1987) (arguing that
the resolution of debts should not change based on whether a bankruptcy court
or non-bankruptcy form resolves the dispute).
169. See Douglas G. Baird, The Reorganization of Closely Held Firms and
the "Opt Out" Problem, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 913, 926-27 (1994).
170. Id.; see also William C. Whitford, What's Right about Chapter 11, 72
WASH. U. L.Q. 1379, 1388-89 (1994) (discussing reason that Baldwin-United
filed a liquidating Chapter 11).
171. See 11 U.S.C. § 303 (1994).
172. See St. James Capital Corp. v. Pallet Recycling Assocs. of N. Am., Inc.,
589 N.W.2d 511, 516 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999) (noting that while directors of
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3. Collecting the Fine
Only the debtor-in-possession ("DIP") or Trustee (or a creditors'
committee acting on their behalf) should be allowed to sue the
directors and any fine assessed should be payable to the Estate, not
individual creditors. 173 Giving only one entity standing to sue and
making the fine payable only to the debtor should eliminate the
most common concerns raised when proposals are made to increase
director liability. That is, allowing the DIP or Trustee to sue
directors would not expose directors to a large number of unfounded
claims filed by multiple creditors' counsel, who arguably would have
an incentive to file potentially groundless claims on behalf of their
individual claims. 174 Likewise, since the claim can be filed only in
the firm's bankruptcy case, allowing the DIP or Trustee to assert
this claim will not overwhelm the courts, there will not be a
dramatic increase in administrative costs (because there will be only
one claim), nor will there be a risk of inconsistent results. 175 Since
only the firm's bankruptcy estate would be entitled to receive the
fine for the failure to file timely, directors need not fear being sued
later by shareholders or creditors in a derivative capacity. Plus,
directors who remain on the board of the debtor firm would be
required to defend only one claim, which should not prevent them
from functioning as corporate directors.
Trustees should not, however, be limited to collecting the fine
just from the directors (who might either be unwilling or unable to
pay it). If the firm purchases third-party insurance, the Trustee
should also be allowed to seek payment of the directors' fines from
the insurer. 176 Just as Trustees would look to the D&O policy for
insolvent firms have limited duties to creditors, they cannot simply walk away
and allow the corporate assets to waste to the creditors' detriment).
173. Trustees already have standing to file breach of fiduciary duty claims
against the current or former directors of debtor companies. See, e.g., Brandt v.
Hicks, Muse & Co. (In re Healthco Int'l, Inc.), 208 B.R. 288, 300 (Bankr. D.
Mass 1997) (holding that a bankruptcy Trustee has standing to sue directors,
lawyers, and accountants for breach of their fiduciary duties of loyalty and
care), affd in part, Comm'r of Revenue v. Brandt (In re Healthco Int'l, Inc.),
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15379 CD. Mass. July 8, 2001).
17 4. See Creditors' Derivative Suits on Behalf of Solvent Corporations, 88
YALE L.J. 1299, 1315-17 (1979) (suggesting that expanding creditors' rights to
sue the directors of solvent corporations creates the possibility of an increase in
groundless claims filed by attorneys who seek contingent fees from settlement
and the risk of predatory litigation by competitors who obtain a claim against
the corporation merely to file suit).
175. See McDonnell, supra note 156, at 208 (suggesting, with no evidentiary
support, "that multiple creditors will assert competing claims against the
directors alleging a breach of fiduciary duties"); Franklin, supra note 156, at 6.
176. If there is an "insured vs. insured" exclusion in the liability policy, the
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payment, however, directors might also seek to pay the fine from the
insurance proceeds. Whether they should be allowed to do so would
depend on whether paying their claims would harm the debtor firm.
If the proceeds are not property of the debtor firm's estate, the
insurer could pay the claims and the debtor would not be harmed. 177
insurer might argue that neither the DIP nor the Trustee can sue directors,
since both parties arguably would be insureds under the policy. Insurers
exclude insured versus insured claims from coverage based principally on the
desire to avoid collusive claims by the firm against its directors and to prevent
the firm from treating the liability policy as an errors or omissions policy. See
Gray v. Executive Risk Indem., Inc. (In re Molten Metal Tech., Inc.), 271 B.R.
711, 728 (Bankr. D. Mass 2002). Because both the Trustee and DIP are
separate legal entities from the pre-petition firm, and because in many cases
the Trustee acts as an adversary party to the debtor's officers and directors, it is
questionable whether such an exclusion would apply. See id. at 728-29
(concluding that an insurance company could not decline coverage based on the
insured vs. insured exclusion against the Chapter 11 Trustee both because of
the literal language of the policy and also because the Trustee is not the legal
equivalent of the debtor); Rieser v. Baudendistel (In re Buckeye Countrymark,
Inc.), 251 B.R. 835, 840 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2000) (finding that the bankruptcy
trustee is a "separate legal entity that neither represents the Debtor nor owes
the Debtor a fiduciary obligation").
177. Most courts generally conclude that the D&O policy itself is property of
a debtor's estate. SeeFeld v. Zale Corp. (In re Zale Corp.), 62 F.3d 746, 757-59
(5th Cir. 1995); Minoco Group of Cos. v. First State Underwriters Agency of
New England Reinsurance Corp. (In re Minoco Group of Cos.), 799 F.2d 517,
518 (9th Cir. 1986). While some courts have concluded that proceeds are
property of the estate, others have concluded that proceeds are excluded from
the estate. For cases holding that proceeds are property of the estate, see Ochs
v. Lipson (In re First Cent. Fin. Corp.), 238 B.R. 9, 17 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1999)
("It may well be that proceeds of certain D & 0 insurance policies, which
provide direct entity coverage to a corporate debtor, can be considered property
of the estate." (quoting Homsy v. Floyd (In re Vitek, Inc.), 51 F.3d 530, 535 (5th
Cir. 1995))); Int'l Heritage, Inc. v. Gilbert (In re Int'l Heritage, Inc.), 239 B.R.
306, 311 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1999); In re Sacred Heart Hosp., 182 B.R. 413, 421
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995); Circle K Corp. v. Marks (In re Circle K Corp.), 121 B.R.
257, 260 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1990); and, Johns-Manville Corp. v. Asbestos Litig.
Group (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 26 B.R. 420, 434 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983).
Those concluding that proceeds are not property of the estate include La. World
Exposition, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co. (In re La. World Exposition, Inc.), 832 F.2d
1391, 1401 (5th Cir. 1987); Pintlar Corp. v. Fid. and Cas. Co. (In re Pintlar
Corp.), 175 B.R. 379, 385 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1994), rev'd by 124 F.3d 1310 (9th
Cir. 1997); Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Official Unsecured Creditors' Comm. of
Technical Equities Corp. (In re Technical Equities Corp.), 163 B.R. 350, 354, 358
(Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1993); In re Daisy Sys. Sec. Litig., 132 B.R. 752, 755 (N.D.
Cal. 1991); and, Helfand v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 295, 310
(Cal. Ct. App. 1992). For a broader discussion about whether D&O liability
insurance is property of the debtor's bankruptcy estate, see Nan Roberts Eitel,
Now You Have It, Now You Don't: Directors' and Officers' Insurance After a
Corporate Bankruptcy, 46 LOY. L. REV. 585 (2000).
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If the proceeds are property of the estate and directors are not
allowed to seek payment from those proceeds, they arguably could
file an indemnification claim against the firm seeking to be
reimbursed for the fine. 178
Even if such a claim is filed, the firm ultimately should not be
harmed as the claim would be a pre-petition unsecured claim in the
firm's bankruptcy179 which would be paid along with all other
general unsecured claims. 180 In addition, to protect general
unsecured claims from having to share pro rata with the directors,
courts could rely on principles of equitable subordination181 to
further ensure that they are not harmed by payment of the
178. Because the aggregate total amount of coverage under a D&O policy
often includes the limits payable both to the firm (as indemnification or entity
coverage) and its directors (for liability), payments made to directors may
reduce the firm's potential coverage. Ochs, 238 B.R. at 13. That is, because
payments typically are made on a first-come, first-served basis, if the directors'
liability claims equal the amount of the cap, the insurance company would not
be required to pay any of the firm's indemnification or entity coverage claims.
See id.
179. The claim would be a pre-petition claim because the directors' breach
and the firm's obligation to insure the directors occurred pre-petition. See
Christian Life Ctr. Litig. Def. Comm. v. Silva (In re Christian Life Ctr.), 821
F.2d 1370, 1374 (9th Cir. 1987); In re Baldwin-United Corp., 43 B.R. 443, 454
(S.D. Ohio 1984).
180. In re Amfesco Indus., Inc., 81 B.R. 777, 786 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1988).
The indemnification claim could be paid before all other unsecured claims only
if it is viewed as an administrative expense in the firm's bankruptcy.
Administrative expenses are those claims that are "actual, necessary costs and
expenses of preserving the estate." 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A) (1994). Though at
least one court has suggested that a bankruptcy court has the discretion to give
administrative priority to directors' litigation expense claims arising from a prepetition claim, in general, directors' indemnification claims should receive this
priority treatment only if the court concludes that retaining the directors is
essential for the preservation of the bankruptcy estate. See In re BaldwinUnited Corp., 43 B.R. at 462 ("[O]nly if the estate has or will benefit from the
individual's services should administrative priority lie.").
181. There may be some instances where creditors would be harmed if the
directors' fine were paid pro rata with their general unsecured claims and, in
that case, the court should consider subordinating the directors' claims. Courts
can equitably subordinate claims pursuant to section 510(c) of the Bankruptcy
Code for reasons of equity and fairness if a creditor has engaged in some type of
misconduct associated with the claim it is asserting in the bankruptcy case. See
11 U.S. C. § 510(c). The doctrine of equitable subordination was established in
Pepper u. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 311 (1939), and further developed in the courts
as a policy against fraud and the breach of fiduciary duties. Though equitably
subordinating claims causes the subordinated claim to be paid after other
claims (not to disallow it), most debtors lack sufficient assets to pay all general
unsecured claims in full. Thus, subordinating the directors' indemnification
claims will in most cases mean that the claims will not be paid.
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directors' fine. 182 Courts often cite a breach of a fiduciary duty as
conduct that justifies equitably subordinating a claim183 and will find
inequitable conduct when a fiduciary misuses his position to the
disadvantage of other creditors or when a third party uses his
position to the disadvantage of other creditors. 184 Given this,
subordinating the indemnification claims of directors who fail to file
a timely bankruptcy petition should be warranted in almost all
cases. 185

182. Even if a creditor's misconduct is not illegal or does not give rise to legal
liability, courts can subordinate a claim if there is proof that the claimant
engaged in some type of inequitable conduct that resulted in injury to the
creditors or conferred an unfair advantage. to the claimant, or if allowing the
creditor to claim a pro rata share in the bankruptcy estate would unfairly harm
other creditors. Stoubmos v. Kilimnik, 988 F.2d 949, 958 (9th Cir. 1993);
Benjamin v. Diamond (In re Mobile Steel Co.), 563 F.2d 692, 700 (5th Cir. 1977);
Allied E. States Maint. Corp. v. Miller (In re Lemco Gypsum, Inc.), 108 B.R.
831, 834 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1988).
183. Estes v. N & D Props., Inc. (In re N & D Props., Inc.), 799 F.2d 726, 732
(11th Cir. 1986) ("Appellee's behavior while in control indicates that she was
acting solely for her own benefit, to minimize her risk of loss without any
consideration for other creditors. Such pursuit of personal gain at the expense
of other creditors has been recognized as a breach of fiduciary duty justifying
equitable subordination." (citing Bergquist v. First Nat'l Bank of St. Paul (In re
Am. Lumber Co.); 7 B.R. 519, 528-29 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1979))); Cosoff v.
Rodman (In re W.T. Grant Co.), 699 F.2d 599, 610-11 (2d Cir. 1983); Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Leroy Holding Co. (In re Fort Ann Express, Inc.), 226 B.R. 746,
755 (N.D.N.Y. 1998); Freytag v. Am. Fed. Bank, F.S.B. (In re Freytag), 155 B.R.
150, 157 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1993) (citing Fabricators, Inc. v. Technical
Fabricators, Inc. (In re Fabricators, Inc.), 926 F.2d 1458, 1467 (5th Cir. 1991));
In re Delta Smelting & Ref. Alaska, Inc., 53 B.R. 877, 885 (Bankr. D. Alaska
1985) (noting "before a bankruptcy court may disallow or subordinate a claim,
some basis must exist of the sort traditionally cognizable by equity as justifying
its intervention, such as fraud, breach of fiduciary duties, mismanagement, [or)
overreaching" (quoting Stebbins v. Crocker Citizens Nat'l Bank (In re
Ahlswede), 516 F.2d 784, 788 (9th Cir. 1975))).
184. Capitol Bank & Trust Co. v. 604 Columbus Ave. Realty Trust (In re 604
Columbus Ave. Realty Trust), 968 F.2d 1332, 1353, 1359-60 (1st Cir. 1992)
("The doctrine [of equitable subordination) permits a bankruptcy court to
rearrange the priorities of creditors' interests, and to place all or part of the
wrongdoer's claim in an inferior status."); Allied E. States Maint. Corp., 108
B.R. at 836 n.3 (finding that absent equitable subordination, "[t)he cumulative
effect of the [directors'] conduct would be to elevate them to a secured status by
which they would be made whole to the extent of the value of the assets of the
estate, while at the same time depriving unsecured creditors of their pro rata
share").
185. Because all directors have a duty to creditors once the firm becomes
insolvent, failing to protect those interests by filing a timely bankruptcy
petition arguably would warrant subordinating all directors' claims, not just
those of the inside directors. However, a claim of a truly independent outside
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Defenses to Breach of Duty

Truly independent directors who rely in good faith on the advice
rendered by independent financial advisors (who themselves must
186
lack a conflict of interest with the firm) should have at least a
qualified defense to a claim that they breached the duty to timely
file. 187 Though directors should not be required to seek outside
advice to avoid breaching the duty to timely file, directors likely will
conclude that it is in their best interests to seek-then followadvice provided by truly independent financial experts who have no
actual or perceived conflict of interest. Directors who learn from
either internal or external financial experts that the firm is
approaching insolvency or is already insolvent can use the expert's
advice, protect the firm, and place the firm under the protection of
the bankruptcy court. Conversely, directors who seek external
advice and either disagree with the advice or conclude that they can
resuscitate the firm outside of bankruptcy can rationally choose not
to place the firm in a bankruptcy proceeding (with full knowledge of
their potential liability if the firm subsequently files).
If the expert opines that the firm is not insolvent but that
opinion is an erroneous one, directors should have the right to sue
the expert to recover any damages they must pay for breaching the
director should not be subordinated if the director can establish by board
minutes that he voted in favor of a timely bankruptcy filing but was outvoted.
In that case, the outvoted director should be allowed to assert his unsecured
claim with all other unsecured claims. At least with respect to the Enron
directors, it is unclear how many of the purportedly outside directors were truly
independent, given their consulting and other pecuniary relationships with
Enron. See Abelson, Enron's Collapse, supra note 81, at Cl.
186. See In re Tri-Star Pictures, Inc., Litig., 634 A.2d 319, 323 (Del. 1993)
(noting the "questionable reliability" of a financial advisor's opinion where the
financial advisor, at the time it gave a fairness opinion to the firm regarding a
business combination, was party to an agreement with that firm which provided
for the advisor to continue to provide investment banking services to the firm
and the combined entity).
187. Because directors have a duty to become reasonably confident about the
veracity of opinions, reports, or other forms of outside advice before making
decisions in reliance on that advice and must actively oversee the expert's work,
they should have only a qualified defense to a breach of duty claim. Mills
Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1283-84 (Del. 1989); REVISED
MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT § 8.30(e) (1985). Given the superior knowledge the
firm's inside directors possess, they generally should not be allowed to assert a
qualified defense, especially if they failed to disclose information to the other
members of the board or the boards' external experts and if the withheld
information would have alerted either the board or the external experts of the
firm's insolvency. Cf Graham v. Taylor Capital Group, Inc. (In re Reliance Sec.
Litig.), 135 F. Supp. 2d 480, 502-03 (D. Del. 2001) (discussing liability of outside
directors under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act).
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duty to timely file unless the directors waived this right in the
expert's engagement agreement. 188 Moreover, directors also should
be allowed to rely on the expert financial advice as a defense if the
DIP or Trustee seeks to subordinate their indemnification claims. 189
V. CONCLUSION
Current legal rules fail to respond to behavioral tendencies that
cause directors to refuse to relinquish exclusive control of the firm
by placing it under the protection of the bankruptcy court. Chapter
11 reorganizations are designed to either preserve the ongoingconcern value of firms or efficiently liquidate them. Encouraging
earlier filings should increase the likelihood that the firm can
successfully reorganize, should decrease the likelihood that the firm
will need to file serial bankruptcy petitions, and should yield greater
benefits for the firm's community of interests (including creditors,
188. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e) (2001). This would be consistent with
state statutes that provide a safe harbor for directors who rely on outside advice
but are later accused of breaching their fiduciary duties to shareholders. For
example, directors of Delaware corporations shall, in the performance of their
duties, be:
[F]ully protected in relying in good faith upon the records of the
corporation and upon such information, opinions, reports or
statements presented to the corporation by any of the corporation's
officers or employees, or committees of the board of directors, or by
any other person as to matters the member reasonably believes are
within such other person's professional or expert competence and who
has been selected with reasonable care by or on behalf of the
corporation.
I d. If the financial advisor's engagement letter exculpates the advisor from, or
indemnifies the advisor against, liability, the directors would not be allowed to
sue. The only exception would be in cases of gross negligence or willful
misconduct. See Daniel C. Cohn, Advising the Board of Directors of a
Financially-Distressed Company (June 18-19, 2001), at http://www.abiworld.
org/abidata/online/conference/01banker/Cohn.html; see also Marsha L.
Goldstein, Retention of Professionals in Bankruptcy Cases: Ethical Issues and
Special Considerations, in CHAPTER 11 BUSINESS REORGANIZATIONS (2002),
available at WL SG108 ALI-ABA 245, at *262; Sidney J. Nurkin et al.,
Fiduciary Duties of Boards of Directors of Financially Troubled Corporations, in
REPRESENTING TECHNOLOGY COMPANIES IN THE NEW BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT
(Dec. 2001), available at WL 683 PLI/Pat 213, at *237-38 (noting exception to
exculpation clauses when director authorizes an unlawful distribution); David
F. Smith, Investment Banking Perspective, in STRUCTURING MERGERS &
ACQUISITIONS 2001 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course, Handbook Series No. BOOOZD), available at WL 1224 PLI/Corp 7, at *23.
189. That is, if external experts erroneously conclude that the firm is solvent
and directors ultimately are sued for the failure to timely file, any
reimbursement claim should be paid pro rata with other unsecured claims
rather than being subordinated under section 510 of the Bankruptcy Code. See
11 u.s.c. § 510 (1994).
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shareholders, employees, suppliers, and the local community)
whether the firm is liquidated or reorganized in the bankruptcy
proceeding. Specifying that directors have a fiduciary duty to the
firm to file timely a bankruptcy petition will help combat the
behavioral biases that prevent directors from filing early bankruptcy
petitions and will also help clarify the current uncertainty directors
face when considering the scope of their fiduciary duties postinsolvency.

